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Panel Discussion: The Future of Biofuel
duction than is economically efficient. If ethanol
is not economically competitive with gasoline,
then subsidies distort the market by steering
investment away from economically attractive
gasoline and toward economically unattractive
ethanol. Consumer well-being and overall eco-
nomic efficiency suffer as a consequence.
Support of ethanol subsidies and consumption
mandates offer a mix of arguments to justify govern-
ment intervention. Those arguments can be neatly
sorted into two categories: those that forward wealth
distribution claims and those that forward efficiency
claims. The former arguments, although interesting,
are not addressed in this paper. Ethanol may or may
not transfer wealth to rural America, for instance,
but preferences with regard to wealth allocation
are subjective and not worth much analytic time.
The latter arguments, however, are grounded in
concrete claims that can be proven or disproven
and are, thus, the focus of this paper.
To have any intellectual force, the argument
that ethanol subsidies and consumption mandates
enhance economic efficiency must begin with a
discussion of market failure. Economists broadly
agree that, as a general rule, leaving production
and consumption decisions to market actors proves
more economically efficient than leaving the same
to governmental planners. Only if some unique and
fundamental failure occurs that prevents gains to
trade in a given market is there room for the argu-
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I
f corn ethanol is such a wonderful product,
why does it require government subsidy?1
If ethanol is truly economically competitive
with gasoline absent government prefer-
ence—as many of its supporters seem to believe—
then private investors will produce ethanol for the
market regardless of whether government lends a
hand (Tyner and Taheripour, 2008).2 Subsidies in
this case will simply result in more ethanol pro-
1 This paper is exclusively concerned with ethanol made from corn.
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to ethanol are in relation
to ethanol made from corn. When economists discuss ethanol subsi-
dies, they are almost always referring to four subsidies in particular:
a $0.51 per gallon blenders’ tax credit afforded to refineries that use
ethanol in motor fuel (known in the law as the Volumetric Ethanol
Excise Tax Credit, it is scheduled to be reduced to $0.45 per gallon
in 2009); a Renewable Fuels Standard that requires U.S. refiners to
consume a certain amount of ethanol per year (9 billion gallons, for
instance, in 2008, rising to 36 billion gallons by 2022); a 2.5 percent
ad valorem tariff on ethanol imports; and a $0.51 per gallon tariff on
the same. However, a number of other direct and indirect federal,
state, and local subsidies afforded to the ethanol industry in aggre-
gate are quite large but are rarely considered in the peer-reviewed
literature (Hahn, 2008). That is largely because such subsidies are
difficult to quantify in a satisfactory manner and because they are
often afforded to other industries besides ethanol, leading to debate
about whether it is appropriate to consider them as ethanol subsidies
per se. The Energy Information Administration (EIA; 2008) pegs the
cost of ethanol subsidies to the taxpayer at $3 billion in 2007. The
best guess of the total federal subsidy afforded to the ethanol industry
that year, however, is conservatively estimated at $6.9 to $8.4 billion
and $9.2 to $11 billion in 2008, or $1.50 to $1.70 per gallon of gasoline-
equivalent ethanol (Koplow, 2007).  
2 Tyner and Taheripour (2008) believe that ethanol production in the
United States was (barely) profitable without subsidy (defined as
operations clearing a 12 percent or better return on equity) for the 
first time in 2001. From 2002 to 2003 production returned to unprofit  -
ability absent subsidies, but from 2004 to 2007 significant profits
were realized even without subsidy largely because of the de facto
ban on methyl tertiary-butyl ether as a fuel additive and a surge in
ethanol demand to provide those blending services. In 2008, however,
production again reached the break-even point.
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ment that government intervention improves the
functioning of those markets (Cowen, 1988, and
Cowen and Crampton, 2003). Hence, the case for
ethanol subsidies hinges on whether concrete mar-
ket failures exist in transportation fuel markets.   
This paper examines the claims made about
alleged market failures in transportation fuel mar-
kets. Two claims in particular warrant examination:
that gasoline prices are too low because they do not
account for the national security costs associated
with gasoline consumption and that the environ-
mental costs associated with gasoline consumption
are ignored in the pricing mechanism. Subsidy
proponents argue that if gasoline prices included
both the national security and environmental costs
associated with gasoline consumption, ethanol
would be much cheaper than gasoline and demand
for the latter would grow dramatically. Alas, those
costs (“externalities” in economic parlance) are
not embedded in final consumer prices and thus
market actors, left to their own devices, will over-
consume gasoline and underconsume ethanol.
Other market failures have been alleged but they
are altogether less compelling than these two. A
cursory examination of a few of them follows. 
“BIG OIL” MARKET POWER
We occasionally hear that “Big Oil” exercises
their market power to the detriment of motorists by
restricting ethanol’s entry into end-use fuel markets
(Cooper, 2005). The oil industry’s reluctance to use
high blends of ethanol in gasoline absent a govern-
ment mandate, build ethanol delivery infrastruc-
ture to supply service stations, or provide E85
pumps3 are often marshaled as evidence that oil
companies are unfairly strangling an economic com-
petitor in its bed. The existence of this self-serving
oil cartel is said to explain why this otherwise
commercially attractive transport fuel—ethanol—
requires government subsidies and consumption
mandates.
Yet, as of 2007, 38 percent of the retail fuels
market was composed of independent service
stations, not vertically integrated franchises, and
another 13 percent of grocers and other hyper-
markets. Only 49 percent of retail fuel was sold
by stations associated with major oil companies.
Like  wise, 56 percent of the refining market was
composed of independent, vertically deintegrated
refining companies (Lowe, 2008). Big Oil is sim-
ply incapable of keeping ethanol out of service
stations if profits are to be made by selling ethanol
to motorists. 
Statistical analysis of market data finds no
evidence that market power in the oil sector has
any impact on national retail motor fuel prices,
although mergers and acquisitions have likely
increased fuel prices in some regions while decreas-
ing them in others (Chouinard and Perloff, 2007,
and Taylor and Van Doren, 2006). Likewise, metrics
regarding market concentration in the refining
sector (such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)
do not suggest much market power in four of the
five refining Petroleum Administration Defense
District regions of the United States (Du and Hayes,
2008). 
The economic and regulatory hurdles to enter-
ing the refining or retail sales markets are modest.
Refineries change hands frequently—as do service
stations. This factor is important because many
economists now believe that, if a market is theoreti-
cally contestable, market power is functionally
modest to nonexistent (Baumol, 1982; and Baumol
and Panzer, 1982), although actual entry may still
be important in some industries (Borenstein, 1992).4
Finally, ethanol is delivered primarily by rail
but also by truck and barge. The oil industry is in
no position to block the expansion of that infrastruc-
ture or to prevent third parties from investing in
dedicated ethanol pipelines (ethanol cannot move
through pipelines used for oil or gasoline because
ethanol is water soluble). 
A variation of the above narrative holds that
oil refining capacity is so tight that, absent govern-
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3 E85 is motor fuel that is 85 percent ethanol and 15 percent gasoline.
4 Many states prohibit entry to some extent in retail fuel markets by
preventing major retailers like Cosco, Sam’s Club, and Wal-Mart
from selling motor fuel. Likewise, zoning laws and environmental
regulations have been identified as barriers to entry in some markets.
Those are government failures, however—not market failures—and
should be addressed by deregulation. Given the inclination of many
major retailers to project “green” images to consumers, it may well
be that deregulating entry would increase the availability of ethanol
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ment efforts to promote ethanol, American con-
sumers would have suboptimal volumes of motor
fuel available to them and, accordingly, higher
pump prices. Thus, the argument is that ethanol
increases the amount of motor fuel available—effec-
tively adding to capacity—and serves the role that,
for instance, Hamburger Helper serves in increasing
the volume of food on a plate of ground beef. 
The argument is superficially true. Assume,
for instance, that all ethanol disappeared tomorrow.
In the short run, gasoline refining capacity is rela-
tively fixed and consumers do not respond robustly
to price increases in the short term. Hence, the
highly inelastic short-term supply-and-demand
curves for gasoline suggest that gasoline prices
would increase dramatically—14.6 percent accord-
ing to a 2004 analysis circulated by the Renewable
Fuels Association (Urbanchuk, 2004), a figure that
would be even higher today given ethanol’s larger
share of the motor fuels market in 2008. Supply
and demand are more elastic in the long run, so
ultimately, prices would rise only 3.7 percent in
the long term according to that same analysis.  
What is the market failure, however, that leads
industry to underinvest in refining capacity? Some  -
times we are told that industry conspires to restrain
refining capacity to maximize profit (Cooper, 2007).
This is a variation of the previous argument about
monopoly power in the oil sector. It is also an argu-
ment that, even if true, does not necessarily provide
evidence of market failure. The exercise of market
power may have an impact on wealth distribution
(refinery owners are wealthier and everyone else
is poorer), but it likely has little impact on overall
market efficiency (Posner, 1999).
Many analysts believe that the lack of excess
refining capacity is largely driven by the limited
profits historically made by those who invest in
refining. To the extent that ethanol programs signifi-
cantly reduce refining profits (see Du and Hayes,
2008), the problems ostensibly addressed by ethanol
subsidies may actually contribute to the existence
of the underlying problem. 
Other times we are told that government poli-
cies discourage the construction of new refineries
and the expansion of capacity at existing facilities.
Although it is unclear to what extent this is true,
if government policies inhibit optimal capacity
expansion it is a government failure, not a market
failure, and is best remedied by direct assault on
the policies in question. 
The strongest study offered as evidence that
ethanol subsidies have reduced motor fuel prices
is by economists Xiaodong Du and Dermot Hayes at
the Center for Agriculture and Rural Development
at Iowa State University (Du and Hayes, 2008).
Their regression analysis concludes that ethanol
production has reduced retail gasoline prices by
$0.29 to $0.40 per gallon from 1995 to 2007
because it has “prevented some of the dramatic
price increases often associated with an industry
operating at close to capacity” (p. 13). 
The Du and Hayes study (2008) does not,
however, support the contention that, in a hypo-
thetical world in which ethanol production did
not exist, motor fuel prices would be higher. That
is because the study assumes that, without ethanol
production, gasoline refining capacity would not
have grown any more than it did with ethanol
production. Given that total refining capacity has
historically expanded to meet increased demand
(Shore and Hackworth, 2004), it is likely that, absent
ethanol production, capacity expansion would have
occurred and fuel prices in that counterfactual
world would have been no higher than they were
historically. The authors acknowledge as much:
“Because these results are based on capacity, it
would be wrong to extrapolate the results to today’s
markets. Had we not had ethanol, it seems likely
that the crude oil refining industry would be slightly
larger today than it actually is, and in the absence
of this additional crude oil refining capacity the
impact of eliminating ethanol would be extreme”
(pp. 13-14). 
The Du and Hayes (2008) study also implicitly
assumes a fixed amount of oil production. Ample
anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that oil pro-
ducers have responded to U.S. ethanol production
by reducing investments in upstream production
capacity. This seems reasonable given that ethanol
consumption displaces oil consumption and pro-
jections about the same heavily affect decisions
about investment in future oil production capacity.
Consequently, ethanol’s impact on oil prices is
ambiguous.
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ethanol program, it also finds that the net total of
social cost associated with the refiners’ tax credit,
the ethanol consumption mandate, and the ethanol
tariff (absent any consideration of the alleged
national security or environmental benefits of
ethanol) was $780 million in 2007.
One further point should be made. The exis-
tence of farm subsidies is not a market failure—it
is a government failure. In a narrow sense, ethanol
subsidies may reduce the cost of farm subsidies to
the taxpayer, but a far more direct and less-costly
means of doing the same is simply to dismantle
the farm subsidies in question.
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
Ethanol proponents frequently note that gov-
ernment provides substantial subsidies to the oil
sector. The belief is that those subsidies provide
commercial advantages to oil producers and oil
prices are lower as a consequence; that is, oil sub-
sidies distort the market by encouraging excessive
oil consumption. Thus, ethanol proponents believe
that subsidies for ethanol, beyond simply leveling
the competitive playing field, make the economy
more efficient by reducing oil consumption from
the inefficiently high levels promoted by subsidies
to the oil sector.
The EIA pegged federal oil and natural gas
subsidies at $2.15 billion in 2007 (EIA, 2008). A
more ambitious tally suggests that oil subsidies,
broadly defined, were $5.2 to $11.9 billion in 1995,
or $1.20 to $2.80 per barrel (Koplow and Martin,
1998; the estimate does not include environmental
or national security externalities and, unfortunately,
has not been updated). Although laws and outlays
have changed substantially since Koplow and
Martin’s publication (although the EIA’s tally finds
no appreciable change in the sum of federal oil and
gas subsidies since 1999), their estimate illustrates
the importance of defining subsidy beneficiaries.
To wit, are subsidies programs that exclusively
benefit the targeted industry (the EIA definition),
or do they also include programs that benefit the
recipient and other parties outside that sector of
the economy (the Koplow and Martin definition)?
Even if ethanol subsidies reduced motor fuel
prices, it does not follow that motorists are, on
balance, better off. For instance, the two Iowa State
economists who produced the aforementioned esti-
mate regarding the reduction of motor fuel prices
that has followed from ethanol subsidies (Du and
Hayes, 2008) also contend (in Du, Hayes, and Baker,
2008) that the total social costs associated with
ethanol subsidies are greater than the aggregated
benefits. Cornell economists Harry de Gorter and
David Just (2007b) argue that the spread between
the two is even greater than alleged by Du, Hayes,
and Baker. 
This should not be surprising. Subsidies for
wheat, corn, soybeans, and other crops produce
lower commodity prices, but very few economists
argue that gains to consumers outweigh the effi-
ciency losses imposed by those subsidies on the
economy as a whole. What consumers gain is more
than offset by taxes and the loss as a market actor
in other sectors of the economy. 
FARM SUBSIDIES
Some have argued that ethanol subsidies actu-
ally reduce the net burden of subsidies on the tax-
payer because the higher corn prices yielded by
ethanol subsidies reduce other subsidy payments
that would have otherwise gone to corn farmers.
This appears to be correct, at least for 2007. Reduc  -
tions in loan deficiency payments to corn farmers
exceeded the costs of the ethanol program by $3.45
billion in that year (Du, Hayes, and Baker, 2008). 
Yet it does not follow that ethanol subsidies
therefore enhance efficiency. First, the taxpayer
savings identified by Du, Hayes, and Baker (2008)
do not account for all of the deadweight losses
associated with ethanol subsidies.5 Total dead-
weight losses are, in aggregate, greater than the
advertised savings to the taxpayer (de Gorter and
Just, 2007b). Second, although that same study
finds a net reduction in farm payments from the
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1 2009 81
5 Deadweight losses arise from the economic distortions associated
with tax avoidance and changes in social and economic behavior in
response to regulatory intervention. A textbook exposition of dead-
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in the Middle East, the wars that the U.S. military
engages there to protect oil supplies, the costs
associated with our need to “kiss the ring” of
Middle Eastern oil producers, the economic damage
by terrorists from the flow of petrodollars into their
coffers, and the harm done to U.S. interests by oil-
rich states like Iran, Venezuela, and Russia, then oil
consumption would be far less than it is now. Alas,
it is believed that those national security external-
ities are not embedded in gasoline prices and, as a
result, gasoline consumption is heavily subsidized.
Ethanol consumption is thus suboptimal and
ethanol subsidies are an appropriate remedy.
Economists, however, are far less worried about
the national security costs of America’s reliance on
oil (foreign or otherwise) (Bohi and Toman, 1996)
and with good reason: Economists understand oil
markets far better than do foreign policy elites.
The alleged national security externalities associ-
ated with gasoline consumption are for the most
part a figment of an imagination unmoored from a
good understanding of market reality.6
Blood for Oil
Many believe that reliance on foreign oil
requires the United States to militarily defend
friendly exporting states and to ensure the safety
of oil supply facilities and shipping lanes. Those
marching under banners declaring “No Blood for
Oil” seem to believe that is the case, as do most
mainstream foreign policy analysts. Delucchi and
Murphy (2008) offer a rigorous attempt to quantify
the public dollars associated with the “oil mission.”
They suggest that if motor vehicles in the United
States did not consume Persian Gulf oil, the U.S.
Congress would have likely reduced military expen-
ditures by $13.4 to $47 billion in 2004 (one of the
The EIA calculates that federal oil and gas sub-
sidies outside the electricity sector total $30,000
per million British thermal units (BTUs). Biofuel
subsidies outside the electricity sector, however,
($3 billion of the $3.2 billion of which are directed
at ethanol via the blenders’ tax credit), work out to
$5.72 million per million BTU (EIA, 2008, Table 36).
Using EIA figures for oil and gas subsidies and esti-
mates of the cost of the blender’s tax credit from
Koplow (2007), economist Douglas Tiffany (2008)
calculates that oil subsidies in 2007 were slightly
less than $0.15 per gallon of gasoline while ethanol
subsidies totaled $0.588 per gallon. Whether we
embrace a narrow or broad definition of subsidy,
the conclusion is the same; oil subsidies are rela-
tively trivial while ethanol subsidies are relatively
substantial. 
Although none of the identified oil subsidies is
defensible on economic grounds, they have very
little if any impact on oil prices because they do not
reduce marginal production costs (Metcalf, 2006).
Hence, oil subsidies do not distort the market and
do not disadvantage ethanol producers. There is no
efficiency problem for ethanol subsidies to correct.
Ethanol subsidies, however, are more perni-
cious. Unlike oil subsidies, ethanol subsidies reduce
marginal production costs and, as a consequence,
distort price signals and thus capital allocations
in the market. The ethanol subsidy “cure” in this
case is far worse than the oil subsidy “disease.” 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
EXTERNALITIES
Among the most fashionable preoccupations
in foreign policy circles is “energy security.”
Although the precise meaning of energy security
is unclear, foreign policy elites have long been
concerned about U.S. reliance on foreign energy
(an exception is Gholtz and Press, 2007). Fear of
embargoes and supply disruptions affects how
Western nations deal with oil- and gas-producing
states, what sort of policies are pursued in the
Middle East, and even fundamental questions of
war and peace. 
Proponents of ethanol subsidies argue that if
the price of oil included the cost of our “oil mission”
6 Greene and Leiby (2006) argue that oil-price volatility imposes signifi-
cant economic losses and that ethanol is less subject to disruption
and thus offers economic advantages. Although empirical claims
appear to be untrue, U.S. data from 1960 to 2005 demonstrate that
corn harvests are far more variable than oil import volumes (Eaves
and Eaves, 2007). Even if that were not the case, price volatility does
not suggest a market failure. If ethanol were more commercially
attractive because its price were more stable, refiners would take
that into account when making decisions about optimal motor fuel
blends. The claim that oil price volatility imposes an externality on
third parties does not comport with the standard definition of mar-
ket failure in that the same would hold true for all price changes
anywhere in the economy (economists refer to this phenomenon as a
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two years examined in the analysis). If U.S. motor
vehicles did not consume any oil at all, military
expenditures would have, oddly enough, gone
down by far less: by $5.8 to $25.4 billion in 2004.
The “best guess” of this analysis is that, if U.S.
gasoline consumers were forced to pay for the U.S.
oil mission, gasoline prices would increase by
$0.03 to $0.15 per gallon. 
Simple economics, however, suggests that the
oil mission—however large it may be—is unneces-
sary, regardless of what Congress may think. Oil
producers will provide for their own security needs
as long as the cost of doing so results in greater
profits than equivalent investments could yield.
Because Middle Eastern governments typically
have little of value to trade except oil—oil revenues,
for instance, are 40 to 50 percent of Iranian govern-
ment revenues and 70 to 80 percent of Saudi govern-
ment revenues—they must secure and sell oil to
remain viable (EIA, 2006). Given that their econ  -
omies are so heavily dependent on oil revenues,
Middle Eastern governments have even more incen-
tive than do consuming states to worry about the
security of oil production facilities, ports, and
shipping lanes (West, 2005). 
In short, whatever security our military pres-
ence provides (and many analysts think that our
presence actually reduces security; see Jervis, 2005)
would be provided by incumbent producers were
the United States to withdraw. That Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait paid for 55 percent of the cost of
Operation Desert Storm suggests that keeping the
Strait of Hormuz free of trouble is certainly within
their means. 
The same argument applies to al Qaeda threats
to oil production facilities. Producer states have
such strong incentives to protect their oil infra-
structure that additional Western assistance to do
the same is probably unnecessary. Although ter-
rorists do indeed plot to disrupt oil production in
Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, there is no evidence
to suggest that producer-state security investments
are insufficient to protect their interests.
The U.S. oil mission is thus best considered a
taxpayer-financed gift to oil regimes (and, perhaps,
the Israeli government) that has little, if any, effect
on the security of oil production facilities or, cor-
respondingly, the price of oil. One may support or
oppose such a gift, but our military expenditures
in the Middle East are not necessary to remedy a
market failure. 
Foreign Policy Distortions
Many foreign policy analysts believe that U.S.
oil imports are dependent on friendly relationships
with oil-producing states. The fear is that unfriendly
regimes might not sell us oil—a fear that explains
why former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan supported the two Gulf Wars against
Iraq (Woodward, 2007). Others believe, however,
that maintaining good relations with oil producers
interferes with other foreign policy objectives—
such as the defense of Israel and the pursuit of
Islamic terrorists—and increases anti-American
sentiment in oil-producing states with unpopular
regimes (Scheuer, 2007 and 2008). The problem
with this argument, however, is that its fundamen-
tal premise is incorrect. Friendly relations with
producer states neither enhance access to imported
oil nor lower its price (Adelman, 1995). 
Selective embargoes by producer nations on
some consuming nations are unenforceable unless
all other nations on Earth refuse to ship oil to the
embargoed state or a naval blockade is used to pre-
vent oil shipments into the ports of the embargoed
state. That is because, once oil leaves the territory
of a producer, market agents—not agents of the
producer—dictate where the oil goes, and anyone
willing to pay the prevailing world crude oil price
can have all he or she wants. The 1973 Arab oil
embargo is a perfect case in point. U.S. crude oil
imports actually increased from 1.7 million barrels
per day (MBD) in 1971 to 2.2 MBD in 1972, 3.2 MBD
in 1973, and 3.5 MBD in 1974 (EIA, 2004). Instead
of buying from Arab members of the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the
United States bought from non-Arab oil producers.
The customers displaced by the United States
bought from Arab members of OPEC. Beyond the
modest increase in transportation costs that fol-
lowed this game of musical chairs, the embargo
had no impact on the United States (Fried, 1988,
Parra, 2004, and Adelman, 1995). In short, all that
matters for the majority of consumers is how much
oil is produced for world markets, not from whom
the oil was initially purchased.
Panel DiscussionDo oil-producing nations allow their feelings
toward oil-consuming nations to affect their pro-
duction decisions? Historically, the answer has
been “no.” The record strongly indicates that oil-
producing states, regardless of their feelings toward
the industrialized West, are rational economic
actors. After a detailed survey of the world oil
market since the rise of OPEC, oil economist M.A.
Adelman concluded, “We look in vain for an
example of a government that deliberately avoids
a higher income. The self-serving declaration of
an interested party is not evidence” (Adelman,
1995, p. 31). Philip Auerswald of George Mason
University agrees, stating “For the past quarter cen-
tury, the oil output decisions of Islamic Iran have
been no more menacing or unpredictable than
Canada’s or Norway’s” (Auerswald, 2007, p. 22). 
If energy producers are wealth maximizers,
what do we make of countries that are selling oil
and natural gas to others at below-market rates? For
instance, Russia sold oil to Cuba at below-market
prices during the Cold War; Russia has long sold
natural gas to Ukraine at below-market prices but
has ended its natural gas subsidy to Georgia as
relations have soured; and China sells oil to North
Korea at low rates and used this as leverage to
induce North Korea to bargain over its nuclear
weapons program. 
Two conclusions seem reasonable. First, sellers
have leverage in natural gas markets that is not pos-
sible in oil markets because oil can be transported
easily, whereas natural gas is shipped through
pipe  lines. Buyers have few near-term alternatives
if natural gas sellers reduce shipments. As liquefied
natural gas gains market share, however, natural
gas markets will look increasingly like world crude
oil markets, and the ability of Russia or other
states to extract concessions from consumers will
dissipate. 
Second, the Russia-Cuba and China–North
Korea cases involve poor countries receiving foreign
aid in the form of low-priced oil. We are unaware
of any wealthy Western countries receiving such
in-kind aid from oil-producing countries. 
What if a radical new actor were to emerge on
the global stage? For example, if the House of Saud
were to fall and the new government consisted of
Islamic extremists friendly to Osama bin Laden,
the new regime might reduce production and
increase prices. But that scenario is by no means
certain given that Iran—despite all its anti-Western
rhetoric—has not reduced oil output.7
Regardless, the departure of Saudi Arabia from
world crude oil markets would probably have
about the same effect on domestic oil prices as the
departure of Iran from world crude oil markets in
1978. The Iranian revolution reduced oil produc-
tion by 8.9 percent, whereas Saudi Arabia accounts
for about 13 percent of global oil production today.
Oil prices increased dramatically after the 1978
revolution, but those higher prices set in motion
market supply-and-demand responses that under-
mined the supply reduction and collapsed world
oil prices eight years later (Adelman, 1995). The
short-term macroeconomic impacts of such a sup-
ply disruption would actually be less today than
they were then, given the absence of price controls
on the U.S. economy and our reduced reliance on
oil as an input for each unit of gross domestic
product (Dhawan and Jeske, 2006, Walton, 2006,
and Fisher and Marshall, 2006). 
So while it is possible that a radical oil-
producing regime might play a game of chicken
with consuming countries, producing countries
are very dependent on oil revenue and have fewer
degrees of freedom to maneuver than consuming
countries. Catastrophic supply disruptions would
harm producers more than consumers, which is
why disruptions are extremely unlikely. The best
insurance against such a low-probability event is
to maintain a relatively free economy where wages
and prices are left unregulated by government.
That would do more to protect the West against an
extreme production disruption than anything else
in government’s policy arsenal. 
Oil Profits for Terrorists
Does Western reliance on oil put money in the
pocket of Islamic terrorists? To some degree, yes.
Does that harm Western security? Probably not—
at least, probably not very much. 
7 While it is true that oil production in Iran was about twice as high
under the Shah than it has been under the Islamic Republic, almost
all analysts agree that this reflects the damage to the oil infrastructure
during the 1980-88 war with Iraq, the “brain drain” that has occurred
in response to the revolution, and poor state management of Iranian
oil assets—not the intentional result of state policy.
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Before we go on, it is worth noting that only
15.5 percent of the oil in the world market is pro-
duced from nation-states accused of funding ter-
rorism (Lundberg Survey, 2006). Hence, the vast
majority of the dollars we spend on gasoline do
not end up on this purported economic conveyer
belt to terrorist bank accounts. 
Regardless, terrorism is a relatively low-cost
endeavor and oil revenues are unnecessary for ter-
rorist activity. That a few hundred thousand dollars
paid for the 9/11 attacks suggests that the limiting
factors for terrorism are expertise and manpower,
not money. 
This observation is strengthened by the fact
that there is no correlation between oil profits and
Islamic terrorism. In Taylor and Van Doren (2007),
we estimated two regressions using annual data
from 1983 to 2005: the first between fatalities
resulting from Islamic terrorist attacks and Saudi
oil prices and the second between the number of
Islamic terrorist incidents and Saudi oil prices. In
neither regression was the estimated coefficient
on oil prices at all close to being significantly dif-
ferent from zero.8
During the 1990s, inflation-adjusted oil prices
and profits were low. But the 1990s also witnessed
the worldwide spread of Wahhabi fundamentalism,
the buildup of Hezbollah, and the coming of age
of al Qaeda. Note too that al Qaeda terrorists in
the 1990s relied on help from state sponsors such
as Sudan and Afghanistan—nations that are not
particularly known for their oil wealth or robust
economies. 
Producer states do use oil revenues to fund ide-
ological extremism. Saudi financing of madrassas
and Iranian financing of Hezbollah are good exam-
ples. But given the importance of those undertak-
ings to the Saudi and Iranian governments, it is
unlikely that they would cease and desist these
activities simply because oil profits were down.
They certainly were not deterred by meager oil
profits in the 1990s.9
The futility of reducing oil consumption as a
means of improving national security and energy
independence is illustrated by the fact that states
accused of funding terrorism earned $290 billion
from oil sales in 2006 (Lundberg Survey, 2006).
Even if that sum were cut by 90 percent, that would
still leave $29 billion at their disposal—more than
enough to fund terrorism given the minimal finan-
cial needs of terrorists.
Rents to Bad Actors
When oil prices are high, so too are oil profits
for inframarginal (low-cost) producers. Even if
those profits do not find their way to international
terrorists, they prop up many regimes we find dis-
tasteful. Oil producers in the Second and Third
worlds often use their robust flow of petrodollars
to squelch human rights at home and to menace
neighbors abroad. Many foreign policy elites argue
that oil consumption thus harms our national
security by strengthening these bad international
actors (Lugar and Woolsey, 1999, and Council on
Foreign Relations, 2006). 
It is unclear to what extent oil profits are asso-
ciated with human rights abuses or militaristic
activity. Examples abound: Relatively long-lived
regimes with terrible human rights records—such
as North Korea—have no oil revenues to speak of,
and this is the case even within the same socioe-
conomic region. Denuding Iran and Libya of oil
revenues might produce a government that looks
a lot like Syria, and denuding Venezuela of oil
revenues might produce a government that looks
a lot like Cuba. After all, most of the “bad acting”
petrostates that foreign policy elites worry about
yielded unsavory regimes even when oil revenues
were a small fraction of what they are today. 
The claim that oil revenues increase the threat
posed by such regimes to their neighbors seems
reasonable enough, but again, the extent to which
this is true is unclear. Pakistan is a relatively poor
country with few oil revenues but it has still man-
aged to build a nuclear arsenal and is constantly
on the precipice of war with India. Impoverished,
oil-poor Egypt and Syria have at various times been
8 Unit root tests suggested that fatalities and Saudi oil prices had unit
roots but terrorist incidents did not, so the former were first differ-
enced before the regressions. Even after first differencing, autocorre-
lation existed, so autoregressive terms were added to each regression,
which further weakened the insignificant relationships.
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9 Although little is known about funding trends associated with Iranian
support for Hezbollah, the Iranian government probably spends no
more than $25 to $50 million on Hezbollah a year (Cordesman, 2006).
Less is known about Saudi contributions to Islamic extremism
(Prados and Blanchard, 2004).the most aggressive anti-Israeli states in the Middle
East. Russia launched its war with Chechnya before
oil revenues engorged its treasury. 
While I have little doubt that—all other things
being equal—a rich bad actor is more dangerous
than a poor bad actor, the marginal impact of oil
revenues on “bad acting” might well be rather small.
That unsavory petrostates have been fully capable
of holding on to power, oppressing their people,
and menacing their neighbors during a decade
associated with the lowest inflation-adjusted oil
prices in history (the 1990s) suggests that nothing
short of rendering oil nearly valueless will have
any real effect on regime behavior. 
For the sake of argument, however, let us
assume that there is some incremental benefit
associated with reducing oil revenues to bad-acting
oil producers. Unfortunately, we have only very
blunt and imperfect instruments at hand to achieve
that end. Policies that might reduce oil consump-
tion would reduce oil demand—and thus, reduce
revenues—for all oil producers, regardless of
whether they are bad actors. Producers in the North
Sea, Canada, Mexico, and the United States (which
collectively supplied 20.1 million barrels of oil per
day in 2006, or 24 percent of the world’s crude oil
needs that year) would be harmed just as producers
in Venezuela, Iran, Russia, and Libya (which col-
lectively supplied 20.3 million barrels per day in
2006) (EIA, 2007). 
Given bad acting aplenty in 1998 with the
lowest real oil prices in world history, it is unlikely
that even the most ambitious policies to reduce
oil consumption would have much effect on bad
acting. Accordingly, there is good reason to doubt
that the foreign policy benefits that might accrue
from anti-oil policies would outweigh the very real
costs that such policies would impose on both con-
sumers and innocent producers. There are certainly
better remedies available to curtail bad behavior
abroad.
The Ethanol Remedy
If significant national security externalities did
exist and were, as a result, significantly affecting
gasoline prices, the most direct and efficient remedy
would be a tax on oil imports. That would get gaso-
line prices “right” and lead to optimal motor fuel
consumption patterns. Countervailing ethanol sub-
sidies are an extremely inefficient means of reme-
dying the problem given the deadweight losses
and inefficiencies associated with most forms of
subsidy. They also substitute prospective market
judgments regarding appropriate motor fuel con-
sumption with political judgments that are unlikely
to prove correct.
Regardless, ethanol production cannot displace
significant amounts of gasoline consumption
(Akinci et al., 2008). Even if the entire U.S. corn
harvest were dedicated to ethanol production, only
3.5 percent of current gasoline consumption would
be displaced (Eaves and Eaves, 2007). All available
cropland in the United States would have to be
dedicated to corn production if all U.S. vehicles
were powered by fuel composed of E85 ethanol.
By 2036, all rangeland and pastureland would have
to be added to that total to maintain adequate pro-
duction. By 2048, all land outside of urban centers
would be required for corn production (Dias de
Oliveira, Vaughan, and Rykiel, 2005). Thus, no
matter one’s opinions about the dangers of oil
dependence (foreign or otherwise), corn ethanol
cannot displace enough oil to matter. 
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES
Many believe that gasoline consumers are
being subsidized because they are not required to
compensate third parties for the air pollution
associated with gasoline consumption. If those
environmental externalities were “internalized”
via regulation or taxes, gasoline prices would be
far higher, gasoline consumption would be conse-
quently lower, and ethanol production would be
far greater. Ethanol subsidies are defended as the
second-best means of improving market efficiency.
There are three difficulties with this argument.
First, it is very unclear how large the externalities
are in monetary terms, making it impossible for
analysts to know whether interventions to correct
those externalities are actually improving or worsen-
ing market efficiency. The best available evidence,
however, suggests that the air emissions externali-
ties are probably so low that internalizing them
via the first-best policy avenue—a pollution tax—
would not affect gasoline prices enough to sig-
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nificantly affect the motor fuels market. Second,
ethanol’s environmental advantages relative to
gasoline are greatly overstated. The negative envi-
ronmental externalities associated with ethanol may
well be even greater than those associated with
gasoline.10 Even if they are not, ethanol’s environ-
mental advantages are almost certainly not large
enough (in monetarized terms) to significantly
alter the fuel mix in motor fuels markets. Third,
ethanol subsidies are an extremely inefficient means
of addressing the environmental externalities of
gasoline; far better means of addressing this market
failure exist.
Conventional Air Pollutants
It is unclear to what extent there are uninter-
nalized externalities associated with conventional
air pollutants from gasoline. A recent review of the
peer-reviewed literature suggests that monetized
damages from the same might range from $0.016
to $0.184 per mile, which translates into $0.36 to
$4.20 per gallon (Parry, Walls, and Harrington,
2006). A frequently cited “best guess” regarding the
cost of the conventional air emissions generated
by gasoline consumption is $0.16 per gallon (Parry
and Small, 2005).
The biggest problem with the above exercises—
beyond the uncertainty associated with the human
health impacts of exposure to small doses of poten-
tially dangerous air contaminants—is that these
studies do not consider the extent to which existing
regulation imposes costs on gasoline consumption
and the extent to which those costs function as a
tax. If, for instance, the conventional air emissions
externality were $0.16 per gallon but regulatory pol-
icy reduced emissions to where they would have
been had a $0.16 per gallon tax been imposed in a
world without regulation, then there would be no
externality: The consumer would, in a sense, be
paying for the pollution costs associated with gaso-
line consumption (albeit indirectly). Accordingly,
the above calculations provide limited guidance
to policymakers seeking to promote optimal gaso-
line prices (Nye, 2008).
Regardless, ethanol is a poor remedy for what-
ever externalities may exist in this arena. A review
of the academic literature finds that, when evapo-
rative emissions are taken into account, ethanol in
fuel blends sold on the market today
• increases emissions of total hydrocarbons,
nitrogen oxides, nonmethane organic com-
pounds, and air toxics (particularly acetal  de  -
hyde, formaldehyde, ethylene, and methanol)
relative to conventional gasoline; but 
• decreases emissions of carbon monoxide
(Niven, 2005; other studies broadly con-
sistent with Niven’s findings include 
von Blottnitz and Curran, 2007, and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency [EPA],
2007).
We pause here to note that carbon monoxide
emissions are only a very modest problem in the
United States today. Because few areas of the United
States violate federal air quality standards for car-
bon monoxide, ethanol provides little benefit on
that front. The other pollutants at issue, however,
worsen urban smog and the concentration of dan-
gerous air toxics—far more serious human health
matters. 
Ethanol proponents often argue that stronger
ethanol blends—like E85—are cleaner. Those con-
tentions are not consistent with the reviews of the
literature cited above. Nor are they consistent with
a recent study concluding that universal use of E85
would increase ozone-related mortality, hospital-
ization, and asthma by 9 percent in Los Angeles
and 4 percent in the United States as a whole rela-
tive to a world in which the auto fleet were pow-
ered entirely by conventional gasoline (Jacobsen,
2007).
Air Toxics
The above studies explicitly consider toxic air
emissions in their analyses, but a recent paper for
10 Although I only examine conventional air and greenhouse gas
emissions in this paper—the main environmental advantages that
subsidy proponents allege for ethanol—ethanol has a number of
other environmental disadvantages relative to gasoline. The main
issues include groundwater contamination (Niven, 2005), water
resource use and surface water pollution (National Research Council,
2008; Donner and Kucharik, 2008; and Nassauer, Santelmann, and
Scavia, 2007), soil erosion (Patzek, 2004), and habitat destruction
(Nassauer, Santelmann, and Scavia, 2007, and Dias de Oliveira,
Vaughan, and Rykiel, 2005). Whatever advantages ethanol may have
with regard to air emissions (which I believe to be, at best, nonexist-
ent) must outweigh the environmental harms it creates. 
Panel Discussionthe Energy Future Coalition (Gray and Varcoe, 2005)
argues that the environmental costs of gasoline-
related air toxic emissions total approximately
$250 billion per year. Although their paper has
received little attention in academic circles, it has
received modest attention in policy circles, so a
brief discussion is in order.
Gray and Varcoe (2005) argue that the direct
harms from the various toxic emissions from aro-
matics in gasoline total about $64 billion a year. But
those aromatics also contribute to the formation of
particulate matter (PM) in the atmosphere, and the
harms from PM that can be traced back to aromatic
gasoline emissions are said to equal at least $200
billion a year. Gray and Varcoe round the total sum
to $250 billion a year (which was equal to about
$1.78 a gallon in 2005) and argue that “leveling
the playing field” would justify an equivalent sub-
sidy to the ethanol industry. 
The $64 billion estimate for the benefits associ-
ated with reducing aromatic emissions, however,
is derived from the costs associated with reducing
toxic air emissions in the industrial sector. Yet there
is little reason to believe that the costs of emission
controls equal the benefits from the same. Gray and
Varcoe (2005) justify this leap of faith by citing EPA
contentions that the benefits from the regulation
of industrial air toxic emissions have in the past
exceeded the costs of doing so. But even if the EPA
is correct, there is no reason to assume that the cost
of reducing toxic air emissions from point sources
x years ago has relation to the costs (or benefits) of
reducing toxic air emissions from automotive tail  -
pipes today.
Gray and Varcoe’s (2005) estimate for the costs
associated with PM formation that can be traced
back to gasoline aromatics likewise emerges from
a problematic set of assumptions. They posit that
40 percent of all PM2.5 is carbon based and then
assume that half of this mass (when adjusted for
population exposures) can be attributed to gasoline
emissions.11 The latter claim appears to be incor-
rect; their own footnote suggests that only 4 to 33
percent of PM2.5 can be traced back to tailpipe
emissions. 
Using the benefit estimates associated with
ambient PM concentration reductions from the
recently established off-road diesel fuel regulations,
Gray and Varcoe (2005) arrive at about $200 billion
in benefits. It is unclear, however, how they trace
those costs to aromatic tailpipe emissions from the
total universe of motor vehicle tailpipe emissions.
Gray and Varcoe (2005), however, well under-
stand the limitations of their analysis: “We empha-
size that these are, necessarily, speculative estimates,
based on various heuristic assumptions that cannot
easily be proven (or refuted, given basic uncer-
tainties)” (p. 52). Normally, claims that cannot be
proven or disproven are called “opinions” or,
alternatively, “religious beliefs.” Let us posit that
we should not use either as the basis for public
policy.
If Gray and Varcoe (2005) were familiar with the
literature on tailpipe emissions, they would not
need such analytic contortions. A review of the
literature finds that the environmental costs associ-
ated with toxic air emissions from gasoline is likely
$0.087 to $1.62 billion annually in 1991 dollars, a
tiny fraction of the $64 billion estimate laboriously
forwarded by Gray and Varcoe (McCubbin and
Delucchi, 1996). While it is unclear to what extent
harm from PM2.5 can be traced back to gasoline
aromatics, the published literature suggests that the
environmental costs associated with all particulate
emissions from motor vehicle tailpipes (not just the
aromatics targeted by Gray and Varcoe) is $16.7 to
$266.4 billion. The authors who reviewed that lit-
erature, however, note that “We are uneasy with
this result, even as an upper-bound” (McCubbin
and Delucchi, 1996, p. 212) because it is heavily
weighted by one study in the literature (Pope et al.,
2002) and that study is both anomalous and method-
ologically problematic (Schwartz, 2006). Likewise,
a recent study (Hill et al., 2009) examines the emis-
sions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and PM2.5 from
gasoline and corn ethanol. It finds that, for each
billion gallons of ethanol-equivalent fuel, gasoline
emissions cost $469 million and corn ethanol emis-
sions $472 to $952 million.
There is little reason to accept the $250 billion
externality estimate by Gray and Varcoe (2005)
and to reject the more careful work in the peer-
reviewed literature cited above. Even were we to
11 PM2.5 means particles less than 2.5 micrometers in aerodynamic
diameter.
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do so, however, it is worth remembering that the
toxic air emissions associated with ethanol are even
greater than the toxic air emissions associated with
conventional gasoline. Hence, even if Gray and
Varcoe were correct, it does not justify countervail-
ing subsidies for ethanol.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
It is difficult to know for certain how ethanol
compares with gasoline with regard to GHG emis-
sions because the data required to perform a satis-
factory energy life-cycle analysis simply do not
exist. Four fundamental problems exist (Delucchi,
2004 and 2006). 
First, limited field and facility data are avail-
able. Aggregated data are thus required to fill in
the holes, and many data points are based on esti-
mates, not observations. Unfortunately, those esti-
mates are frequently only loosely grounded in
reality (Liska et al., 2009). 
Second, some important disagreements about
methodology cannot be easily resolved. For
instance, how far back in the production chain
should we go in the course of tallying energy in  -
puts? What is the best way to disentangle the energy
inputs and GHG outputs associated with ethanol
production from the energy inputs and GHG out-
puts associated with other coproducts (primarily
distillers’ grains for livestock feed) associated with
ethanol production? 
Third—and most important—dynamic variables
can significantly affect the life-cycle analysis but
are generally completely ignored in the literature
because they are difficult to model properly. For
instance, how and to what extent will the contem-
plated policy change prices for millions of goods
and services (both directly and indirectly), and
how will those price changes affect consumption
patterns and, thus, GHG emissions?12 Answering
such complex questions requires a rather sophisti-
cated global general equilibrium model, but none
have been produced or used in the life-cycle analy-
ses of ethanol that have appeared in the literature.
Fourth, even if done well, the life-cycle models
produce findings that are less relevant to policy-
making than advertised. For example, what exact
policy is being suggested by the life-cycle analysis
and is that policy realistic? How does the execution
of that policy impact the dynamic economic factors
mentioned above? What are the opportunity costs
of the contemplated policy? What are emissions at
the margin in response to policy-induced change?
Nonetheless, dozens of studies and several
computer models exist to partially inform analysis
(for instance, Liska et al., 2009; Adler, Del Grosso,
and Parton, 2007; Wang, Wu, and Hong, 2007;
Groode and Heywood, 2007; Hill et al., 2006; Farrell
et al., 2006; Nielsen and Wenzel, 2005; and Patzek,
2004).13 The best is a recent study from researchers
at the University of Nebraska (Liska et al., 2009).
That analysis used the most recent data available
on individual facility operations and emissions,
observed corn yields, nitrogen fertilizer emissions
profiles, and coproduct use; all of which prove
important because of improved energy efficiencies
associated with ethanol production over the past
several years. The authors found that the total life-
cycle GHG emissions from the most common type
of ethanol processing facility in operation today
are 48 to 59 percent lower than gasoline, one of the
highest savings reported in the literature. Even
without subtracting the GHG emissions associated
12 “Whatever the exact magnitude of these price effects, they are poten-
tially important enough that they ought to be taken seriously in an
evaluation of the impact of transportation policies on climate. There
is no way to escape this conclusion. We cannot dismiss the effects
because they occur outside of the U.S., or outside of the transportation 
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sector, because in an analysis of global warming, we care about all
emissions, everywhere. We cannot dismiss price effects on the
grounds that a policy will not really affect price, because in principle
even the smallest change has a nonzero probability of leading to a
nonzero effect on price. (In any event, if the price effects are really
so small, then the policy must be so unimportant or ineffective as to
have no affect on climate worth worrying about anyway.) And we
certainly cannot argue that all such price effects are likely to be sub-
stantially ‘similar’ for all policies, and hence of no importance in
comparison of alternatives, because this clearly is not the case”
(Delucchi, 2004, p. 10).
13 I am interested only in those studies that attempt to quantify GHG
emissions, not in those studies exclusively concerned with the net
energy balance of ethanol. The latter issue is theoretically interesting
but it asks a question that is not particularly relevant for policy analy-
sis. Even if ethanol has a negative energy balance (more energy inputs
were required to produce ethanol than is yielded by ethanol on
combustion), if the energy inputs were relatively abundant but the
energy displaced by ethanol were relatively scarce, ethanol could
have a net negative energy balance but still prove profitable and
efficient. Likewise, if the energy inputs have modest GHG emissions
but the energy being displaced by ethanol had significantly larger
GHG emissions, a negative energy balance might still translate into
a net reduction of GHG emissions.with ethanol coproducts (which accounted for 19
to 38 percent of total system emissions), ethanol
would still present GHG advantages relative to
gasoline.
Although the study by Liska et al. (2009)
appears to offer the best current analysis on this
question, many problems remain, rendering policy
analysis problematic. First, the study examines only
a subset of corn production operations and ethanol
processing facilities: dry-mill ethanol processors
fired by natural gas in six Corn Belt states. Together,
those facilities accounted for 23 percent of U.S.
ethanol production in 2006. This approach makes
the study stronger because the authors are not
forced to rely as heavily on estimates and aggregated
analysis, but the downside is that the study ignores
a large number of older, less-efficient ethanol pro-
cessing facilities and thus cannot be used to assess
the GHG balance of the ethanol industry as a whole.
While the findings may well point to where the
industry will be in the future as older, less-efficient
facilities lose market share and are upgraded or
retired (Groode and Heywood, 2007), the bankrupt-
cies that are shuttering many newer facilities at
present caution against certainty on this point. 
Second, estimates regarding emissions are still
relied on to some degree, and one of those estimates
in particular—the estimate pertaining to the release
of nitrous oxide (N2O) from fertilizer use in corn
production—is problematic. Although the study
comports with convention in that it relies on emis-
sion estimates offered by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2006), a recent
study (Crutzen et al., 2007) finds that the IPCC esti-
mates pertaining to N2O release from fertilizer does
not comport with the observed data. Crutzen et al.
(2007) find that N2O emissions from fertilizers used
in biofuel production are three to five times greater
than assumed by the IPCC and that, if we use those
higher emissions in the ethanol life-cycle models
(as Crutzin et al. did using the openly accessible
EBAMM model constructed by Farrell et al., 2006),
“the outcome is that the production of commonly
used biofuels, such as biodiesel from rapeseed and
bioethanol from corn (maize), can contribute as
much or more to global warming by N2O emissions
than cooling by fossil fuel savings” (p. 389). Given
that the lead author of the study—Paul Crutzen—
is a Nobel laureate chemist who has specialized in
fields related to atmospheric science, his findings
cannot be lightly dismissed.
Third, Liska et al. (2009) acknowledge the
importance of the impact of ethanol production on
crop prices and, thus, on global land-use patterns,
but they do not account for the GHG emissions
associated with those changes. Those emissions
are substantial, and no life-cycle analysis of ethanol
can credibly ignore them. 
A worldwide agricultural model constructed by
Searchinger et al. (2008) finds that the increases in
crop prices that follow the increased demand for
ethanol will induce a global change in the pattern of
land use. Those land-use changes produce a surge
in GHG emissions that is dissipated only by conven-
tional life-cycle emissions savings many decades
hence. Although the study modeled ethanol produc-
tion increases that were beyond those mandated in
existing law, “the emissions from land-use change
per unit of ethanol would be similar regardless of
the ethanol increase analyzed” (p. 1239). 
While critics of Searchinger et al. (2008) rightly
point out that (i) the agricultural model employed
in the study was crude, (ii) much is unknown about
the factors that influence global land-use decisions,
(iii) improved yields are reducing the amount of
land necessary to meet global crop demands, and
(iv) any land additions to crop production do not
need to come from forests or other robust carbon
sequestration sinks (Renewable Fuels Association,
2008), none of those observations is sufficient to
reject the basic insight forwarded in Searchinger
et al. (2008).  If ethanol demand increases corn and
other crop prices beyond where they otherwise
would have been, profit incentives will induce
investors to increase crop production beyond where
production would otherwise have been. If that
increased production comes in part from land-use
changes relative to the baseline, then significant
volumes of GHG will likely be released and those
emissions will threaten to swamp the GHG savings
found elsewhere in the life-cycle analysis. Even if
the upward pressure on crop prices as a conse-
quence of ethanol consumption is more than off-
set by downward price pressures following from
other factors, crop acreage retirement will not be
as large as might otherwise have been the case
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and terrestrial sequestration will be lower as a
consequence. Every link in that chain of logic is
unassailable. 
Changing global land use is but one of the
many impacts that ethanol might have on hundreds
of industrial sectors worldwide. The work of
Searchinger et al. (2008) is ultimately unsatisfying
because it is only a crude and partial consideration
of those impacts, many of which might indirectly
affect global land-use patterns. For instance, if
ethanol consumption reduces the demand for—
and thus the price of—crude oil in global markets,
how much of those “booked” reductions in oil
consumption will be offset by increased demand
induced elsewhere by the lower global crude oil
prices that follow (known as a “rebound effect” in
economics)? How might that rebound effect influ-
ence all sorts of GHG emissions vectors? None of
these types of questions are asked in ethanol GHG
life-cycle analyses, but they are clearly crucial to
the analysis.
To summarize, a narrow, conventional consider-
ation of the GHG emissions associated with ethanol
suggests that ethanol reduces climate change harms
relative to gasoline. If the IPCC has underestimated
N2O emissions from fertilizer—as appears to be
the case—then ethanol probably is at best a “wash”
with regard to GHG emissions. Even if that is not
the case, consideration of secondary and tertiary
emissions impacts strongly suggests that most, if
not all, advertised GHG gains are lost in the changes
in land-use patterns that follow increases in ethanol
production relative to the baseline. Other changes
in anthropogenic emissions—positive and nega-
tive—would almost certainly follow as well, but
existing models do not bother to search for them
and thus we do not know enough to say much
beyond this with confidence.
First versus Second-Best Remedies
If there are in fact uninternalized environmental
externalities associated with gasoline consumption,
the most direct and efficient remedy is to impose
a tax on emissions (or a cap-and-trade program
that functions like a tax) to correct prices accord-
ingly. Countervailing ethanol subsidies are a much
less-efficient remedy because they create dead-
weight losses, do not correct gasoline prices or
ethanol prices for environmental externalities, and
impose a market share for ethanol that might not
have arisen in equilibrium.
One might argue that emissions taxes on con-
ventional pollutants in motor fuel markets are
impractical and/or unlikely and that ethanol is a
necessary second-best alternative. But even if so,
tighter regulation of motor fuel emissions is almost
certainly more efficient than ethanol subsidies if
government intervention is warranted. This is par-
ticularly true given that ethanol has substantial air
emissions of its own. Nondiscriminatory emission
regulations that apply regardless of fuel source are
a far more defensible intervention.
Price internalization exercises to address GHG
emissions, however, are not only conceivable, they
are probable in the near term given the current politi-
cal makeup of Washington and voter sentiment.
Once a federal cap-and-trade program is in place,
ethanol proponents will lose the argument that
gasoline prices are suboptimal because they do not
consider the cost of GHG emissions. Of course, one
might always argue that the permit prices yielded
from such a regime are too low to adequately reflect
the damages, but a recent “best guess” about those
damages based on the literature suggests that the
uninternalized GHG externalities associated with
gasoline amount to only about $0.05 per gallon
(Parry and Small, 2005). 
If the displacement of gasoline with ethanol is
in fact among the most cost-effective means of
reducing GHG emissions, ethanol producers should
be able to prove that fact in a carbon-constrained,
cap-and-trade market without government subsidy.
But even if we posit the lowest-bound estimate for
total ethanol subsidies and divide that figure by
the GHG savings reported in Wang, Wu, and Hong
(2007; a 19 percent reduction of total life-cycle GHG
emissions relative to gasoline), we find that $300
of subsidy is necessary to displace a metric ton of
GHG emissions from gasoline. “Based on historical
prices for carbon offsets, this same investment could
have purchased 90-120 times as much displace-
ment on the CCX [Chicago Climate Exchange], the
most appropriate benchmark for the U.S. carbon
market. Even on the more expensive ECX [European
Climate Exchange], the subsidies could have pur-
chased 11 metric tonnes of offsets” (Koplow, 2007,
Panel Discussionp. 35). If we instead use the high end of the GHG
savings reported in Liska et al. (2009) those figures
could be cut by two-thirds—still yielding costs that
could not be sustained if market actors, rather than
political actors, were deciding how best to respond
to a carbon-constrained world. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
SUBSIDY
Although there has long been a debate about
the merits of ethanol subsidies, most parties in the
discussion accepted without question the idea
that subsidizing ethanol reduces oil consumption.
How much, of course, was open to debate. Yet a
rigorous examination of the existing subsidies in
place by Cornell economists Harry de Gorter and
David Just (2007a) finds that one of those subsi-
dies—the blenders’ tax credit—actually subsidizes
gasoline consumption within the context of the
current regulatory regime. 
The conclusion is counterintuitive but the
analysis is sound. The explanation is as follows. By
itself, the blenders’ tax credit ensures that ethanol
is often cheaper than gasoline from the refiners’
perspective. Refiners will thus compete to secure
that ethanol, which results in the price of ethanol
being “bid up” until it is above the market price
of gasoline by at least $0.51 per gallon (the size of
the tax credit). In a world with the blenders’ tax
credit at the 2006 level, retail fuel prices are lower
by 1.9 percent ($2.32 per gallon rather than $2.36
per gallon). Ethanol production increases from
653 million gallons to 6.67 billion gallons while
gasoline production declines from 141.2 billion
gallons to 135.7 billion gallons. The credit serves
as an ethanol consumption subsidy with most of
the benefits going to ethanol producers and the
remainder to motorists.
By itself, the Renewable Fuel Standard (which
mandates specified levels of ethanol consumption)
produces motor fuel costs that are a weighted aver-
age of the cost of ethanol and the cost of gasoline.
In a world with the consumption mandate at the
2006 level, retail fuel prices are 0.48 percent lower
($2.31 per gallon rather than $2.32 per gallon).
Ethanol production increases from 6.67 billion
gallons (assuming a nonbinding mandate in the
form of the ban on methyl tertiary-butyl ether as a
fuel additive) to 10 billion gallons while gasoline
production falls from 135.7 billion gallons to 132.5
billion gallons. The mandate, like the credit, serves
as an ethanol production subsidy with almost all
of the benefits captured by ethanol producers. 
When a tax credit is added to a consumption
mandate, however, there is no incentive for refiners
to bid up the price of ethanol; the mandated demand
for ethanol ensures that ethanol (even with the tax
credit) is more costly than gasoline. Because com-
petition in the refining sector is relatively intense,
refiners cannot capture the full benefit of the tax
credit. Instead, it is passed on to consumers. Using
the 2006 blenders’ tax credit, this produced retail
fuel prices 1.42 percent lower than they would have
been without the tax credit but with the mandate:
$2.31 per gallon rather than $2.34 per gallon.
Ethanol production increases a wee bit—from 9.99
billion gallons to 10 billion gallons—but gasoline
production increases even more—from 132.1 bil-
lion gallons to 132.5 billion gallons. The combined
policies are, in effect, a direct gasoline consump-
tion subsidy with all of the benefits captured by
motorists. 
Such analyses highlight the difficulty of accept-
ing claims about the impact of ethanol production
on foreign oil imports or GHG emissions without
careful consideration of the indirect impact that
subsidies have on the market. Unfortunately, this
is an exercise rarely performed in the literature per-
taining to the advertised benefits of ethanol (and,
implicitly, government preferences for the same).
CONCLUSION
Why should taxpayers subsidize ethanol? The
most commonly offered rationales—that ethanol
reduces harm caused by our reliance on foreign
oil and a host of air pollution problems—do not
hold up to scrutiny. Foreign oil dependence is not
a substantial foreign policy or economic problem,
and ethanol offers little remedy for any problems
that might exist. Environmental gains are likewise
unclear. The balance of the evidence suggests that
ethanol worsens conventional air pollution and
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offers no net reductions in GHG emissions. In fact,
there is good reason to believe that GHG emissions
might well go up as we displace gasoline in favor
of ethanol. 
Even if we were to accept the national security
and environmental benefits claimed most fre-
quently for ethanol in the literature, in 2012 ethanol
subsidies would still cost $3 billion more than the
monetized benefits delivered (Hahn, 2008). 
Other justifications for subsidy have even less
merit. There is little evidence to suggest that “Big
Oil” is strangling ethanol for competitive advantage
or that ethanol on balance reduces motor fuel prices
by any consequential amount. Ethanol subsidies
may in some periods reduce net federal subsidies
to corn producers, but the deadweight losses associ-
ated with ethanol subsidies more than offset this
savings to the taxpayer. Finally, they do not “level
the playing field.” In fact, they distort the playing
field and produce inaccurate price signals which,
in turn, lead to less economic efficiency and, by
force, less overall wealth creation.
Whatever problems exist in motor fuel markets
are better remedied by direct interventions to
address identified problems. Ethanol subsidies are
extremely poor remedies for those alleged problems.
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Rick Tolman
CORN SUPPLY AND DEMAND
A
ccording to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), U.S. corn growers
produced 12.1 billion bushels of corn in
2008, the second-largest crop ever. This harvest
reflects the increasing ability of growers to pro-
duce higher yields, measured in bushels per acre
(bu/acre), due to improvements in agronomic prac-
tices and biotechnology that improve the corn
seed itself. The 2008 national average yield, 153.9
bu/acre, is the second-largest on record.
As high as this yield is (by comparison, the
1988 yield was only 84.6 bu/acre), many in the
corn industry expect it to nearly double well before
mid-century. In fact, many growers who take part
in the National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)
National Corn Yield Contest routinely score yields
much higher than the national average.
Since 1994, corn productivity per acre has
accelerated as a result of advances in marker-
assisted breeding, biotechnology, and improved
farming practices. Growers are harvesting consid-
erably more corn without significantly increasing
acreage. Based on past performance, average pro-
duction per acre is projected (following a 15-year
trend) to hit 180 bu/acre by 2015. Some seed
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bu/acre by 2030. 
Modern farm management practices play an
important role in increased productivity, along
with new and improved production tools, such as
global positioning systems, yield mapping, and
precision nutrient-application methods. Nation  -
wide, corn growers are harvesting more corn per
acre while making great strides in efficient input
use. This is resulting in a more sustainable environ-
mental footprint.
Although corn production is expanding, some
uses for it are not expanding at the same rate. Other
corn demand categories, such as livestock pro-
duction and exports, have shown limited future
growth—meaning that increased corn supplies
will result in more corn available for biofuel pro-
duction. Demand for corn in the livestock and
poultry sectors has been relatively flat in the past
10 marketing years. The amount of raw field corn
fed to livestock is expected to decline slightly as
more corn is displaced by distillers’ grains, a co-
product of ethanol production. Furthermore, the
amount of corn used for human food has been flat,
and corn exports have trended up only slightly.
Even as corn use for ethanol has risen dramati-
cally over the past 10 years, American farmers have
continued to be the world’s top exporter of corn—
satisfying the demands of foreign customers. Corn
exports have remained steady or expanded slightly
and, through exports of distillers’ grains, the ethanol
sector is helping satisfy foreign demand for high-
protein, high-energy livestock feed. The United
States exported about 2.4 million metric tons of
distillers’ grains in 2007. 
The Food and Agricultural Policy Research
Institute’s (FAPRI) 2008 U.S. and World Agriculture
Outlook (Carriquiry et al., 2008) provides projec-
tions for agricultural commodity production and
disappearance. It considers average weather pat-
terns, existing farm policy, current trade agreements,
and customs unions.
FAPRI projects that the nation’s corn growers
will harvest 15.2 billion bushels in 2015. This is
congruent with NCGA’s vision of corn growers being
able to harvest 15 billion bushels by 2015. FAPRI
projects corn volume to produce ethanol to reach
5.2 billion bushels in 2017. This increase will result
in 10 billion bushels of corn for all non-ethanol
use categories. And this is projected to be accom-
plished with only a limited increase in planted
acres over the 93.6 million acres used in 2007.
The growing demand for ethanol is projected
to keep pace with the projected increases in total
corn production into 2017. FAPRI projects that most
of the historic non-ethanol uses of corn will pro-
vide little growth. Given the rising cost of produc-
tion, absent a market for ethanol the nation’s corn
producers would once again face marginal profits
from high production and insufficient demand. 
THE VALUE OF ETHANOL
Ethanol is a significant market for U.S. corn,
but its value goes far beyond its role as a major use
of corn. Developing this new value-added industry
not only creates a new market for our corn pro-
ducers, it lessens our dependence on foreign oil
and helps revitalize rural America. 
Ethanol plants are helping rejuvenate rural
communities across the country by creating high-
paying jobs, boosting local tax revenues, and creat-
ing partnership opportunities for local businesses.
Rural communities across America face an increas-
ing challenge (brain drain) as they strive to create
opportunities for their youth to remain in their local
communities. The ethanol industry is the single
most important industry created by the agricultural
sector in decades allowing rural American commu-
nities to continue to remain economically viable.
The demand for corn ethanol production was
originally created in response to the oil crisis of
the 1970s. After the crisis was resolved, oil prices
dropped to a level that challenged the economic via-
bility of biofuels. This situation has now changed,
however, as oil prices have moved erratically and
the viability of biofuels has strengthened. In con-
junction with positive economics, public policy
initiatives have helped break oil companies’ control
of the liquid transportation distribution systems.
Even with the Renewable Fuel Standard
passed by the U.S. government and the subsequent
rise in the demand for corn, the long-term economic
health for corn producers is far from secure. With
the production efficiency increases stated above
combined with the steady acreage dedicated to
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corn production, supply will either continue to
match demand or problematically outpace demand. 
According to the USDA’s pricing models based
on more than 30 years of data, corn prices over the
next 10 to 15 years will reach a new plateau, but
farm profitability will remain tight mainly because
of increases in input costs driven by the price of oil.
Raw material costs for inputs like nitrogen fertilizer
are reaching record gains and do not move through
the distribution system as quickly as, say, conven-
tional gasoline, while other inputs like diesel fuel
are already affecting producers. Thus, the rise in
corn prices had a positive impact on corn growers
in 2007-08, but the long-term reality in the current
environment is that producers will see very tight
to negative margins. 
Continued strong growth in the ethanol sector
will keep corn producers viable, which can keep
oil consumption in check while continuing to pro-
vide a substantial amount of feed to the livestock
industry through distillers’ grains. This will be a
challenge in the current economic environment,
where the subprime mortgage crisis had increased
the cost of capital. Farming is a capital-rich propo-
sition and producers now require two to three times
more capital just to produce a crop. 
Ethanol has revitalized the rural landscape,
provided a new market for domestically produced
grain, and dented our need for imported oil, but it
has not done so irresponsibly. Corn to ethanol is—
and will remain—a healthy economic growth tool,
not a get-rich-quick scheme for producers, and the
ripples from this positive market will reach those
beyond the farm gate to benefit anyone who uses
energy and eats food.
RESPONDING TO THE 
MYTHMAKERS
Food versus Fuel
Diverting agriculture crops from the table to
the fuel tank has been the focal point of critics
stirring the so-called food-versus-fuel controversy.
Any discussion of corn ethanol, however, must
consider two factors: the shifting nature of our
country’s crops and the price of corn (specifically,
its impact on overall food prices).
Farming acreage has been trending downward
during the past few decades. In 1932, when corn
reached its highest acreage count, 320.4 million
acres of farmland were under cultivation country-
wide; in 2007 total acreage under cultivation was
an estimated 278.1 million. The development of
suburban communities in the second half of the
twentieth century was a major contributor to the
decrease of both farmland and parkland acreage.
Crop production, however, is an even more
significant issue regarding demand for certain crops
and how it is met: Corn yield increased more than
fivefold between 1932 and 2007. The average yield,
represented as bu/acre, grew from 26.5 bu/acre in
1932 to an estimated 151.1 bu/acre in 2007, and
experts believe average yield can increase to 180
bu/acre or more over the next decade, as noted
above.
As consumers, we all understand the pinch
to our pocketbooks when food prices increase.
Grocery shoppers and restaurant diners need to
understand that the cost of food ingredients in
products they buy represents less than one-fifth of
the price at checkout. So how much of an impact
do rising corn prices have on overall food prices?
Food prices are largely determined by costs and
profits after commodities leave the farm. On aver-
age, only about 19 percent of the price of food can
be attributed to ingredients. Marketing and trans-
portation costs comprise a much higher portion of
total costs. For example, consider the impact of
rising corn prices on a box of corn flakes as out-
lined in Table 1 and the following significant facts
about food production. 
About 50 percent of the corn crop is used for
animal feed. Corn makes up a relatively large share
of the product prices of eggs, pork, and poultry.
Beef and dairy products also contain significant
costs for corn, but the prices of processed foods are
largely determined by the cost of other components:
• International demand for dairy products has
outstripped international supply. Moreover,
the world demand for dairy products has put
U.S. products onto world markets, thereby
raising prices.
• Agriculture is playing a large role in the
supply of U.S. fuel. Agriculture’s involve-
ment will help offset any increase in food
Panel Discussionprices, with lower fuel costs and cleaner,
less-polluting renewable fuels. Moreover,
government payments to farmers will be
reduced as a result of higher crop prices, for
example, they were $6 billion less in 2007.
• Combining the efficiencies at the farm with
increased ethanol yields from grain, an acre
of corn can produce more than 400 gallons
of ethanol, compared with 320 gallons only
10 years ago. With the implementation of
biomass conversion and increased grain
yields, the grain ethanol industry is expected
to reach 600 gallons of ethanol per acre in
the next decade.
Net Energy/Liquid Petroleum
Displacement
A key metric for judging the success of alterna-
tive fuels is whether the product supplies more
energy than is needed to produce it. This may seem
like a straightforward calculation, but it has been
hotly debated because of different methods of quan-
tifying energy value. Another layer of complexity
is that today’s accounting for energy inputs versus
outputs is no longer satisfactory. One must also
look at the quality of that energy in terms of non-
renewable carbon dioxide (CO2) and CO2 equiva-
lents generated in fuel production and use. The
common terms used for these analyses are “net
energy” and “liquid petroleum displacement.”
First, a few clarifying points will aid the dis-
cussion of ethanol and liquid petroleum displace-
ment. The common metric of British thermal units
(BTUs) per gallon is used when measuring the total
energy content of a liquid fuel. Analysis of current
transportation fuels—mainly conventional gaso-
line—yields a value of approximately 110,000
BTUs per gallon.
Ethanol, by comparison, yields only 84,000
BTUs per gallon. This fact is interpreted by many
to imply that ethanol is a lesser energy product than
gasoline. In reality, all this shows is that ethanol
has a lower energy density than gasoline. Depend  -
ing on the engine using the ethanol and ethanol-
blended fuels, efficiencies in converting the liquid
potential energy into kinetic energy can be almost
on par with each other. Today the engines in the
North American fleet capable of burning the higher-
blend ethanol fuel, E85, are not yet optimized for
ethanol. They run more efficiently on conventional
fuel. As flexible-fuel vehicle (FFV) adoption
increases and ethanol availability becomes more
widespread, this performance discrepancy will be
addressed.
Understanding the energy density discrepancy
between the two fuels is necessary to better under-
stand the second part of this issue, net energy bal-
ance. The core of net energy balance is this: How
much energy do you get out compared with how
much energy you put in? Since the late 1980s,
more than 25 studies have examined the energy
balance of ethanol. Only six have shown ethanol
to have a negative energy balance (more energy
used in production than is delivered to the vehicle).
The most recent study (Liska et al., 2009) reviewed
several different ethanol production examples,
and found that eight corn-ethanol scenarios had
net energy ratios from 1.29 to 2.23. For the most
common biorefinery types, the net energy ratio
ranged from 1.50 to 1.79.
Nevertheless, media outlets have consistently
cited both sides of this argument in an attempt to
be “balanced”—while not informing the public of
the discrepancy in study results. It frustrates the
ethanol industry that media outlets continue to
focus on studies that cite a negative energy balance
for ethanol even though these studies are few in
number. Beyond the net energy argument, it
becomes exceedingly clear that the net CO2 emis-
sions for biofuels such as ethanol are significantly
lower than petrochemicals, which are nonrenew-
able CO2 sources in and of themselves.
It does take energy to produce ethanol: Natural
gas and electricity are used to power ethanol plants,
and fertilizer and diesel engines are needed to
grow and harvest corn. Studies repeatedly have
shown the energy required to produce ethanol is
less than the energy ethanol delivers for personal
vehicle use. Moreover, most critics of ethanol on
net energy grounds fail to perform similar analyses
of petroleum-based gasoline’s net energy. In fact,
petroleum performs worse than ethanol under this
direct comparison. Ethanol’s biggest advantage is
that it can continue to use less and less fossil energy
for production through greater efficiencies, as well
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as the use of other renewable sources of energy to
power ethanol plants.
POLITICAL ISSUES
Two salient political issues will have a tangible
impact on the future of ethanol: higher blends and
FFVs.
Higher Blends
With the passage of the 2007 energy bill, the
Renewable Fuel Standard will require the United
States to use 36 billion gallons of biofuels by 2022.
With this schedule now law as of January 1, 2009,
major infrastructure changes must take place to
facilitate implementation of the standard. 
Moving to higher blends of ethanol will be criti-
cal to the industry. The United States uses roughly
145 billion gallons of gasoline each year. By 2015,
ethanol will comprise at least 15 billion gallons,
or roughly 10 percent of the fuel market. Because
the highest level of ethanol certified for conven-
tional automobiles is currently 10 percent (E10),
the industry must move rapidly to secure certifica-
tion for higher blends (such as E20) for the market
to readily absorb the increasing volumes of ethanol
available beyond a nationwide 10 percent blend.
Otherwise, the ethanol industry will likely hit a
“blend wall” at 10 percent.
Flexible-Fuel Vehicles
Currently, most American, Japanese, and
European auto manufacturers allow only 10 percent
ethanol to be blended into gasoline because of the
composition of rubber sealing joints in fuel systems.
These joints can become compromised with higher
ethanol blends, leading to engine damage. Engine
manufactures will void engine warranties if higher
blends are used. However, technology now exists
to use up to 100 percent ethanol in automobiles—as
has been implemented in Brazil for several decades. 
In the United States, auto manufacturers pro-
duce FFVs that can use E85 (a gasoline blend that
is 85 percent ethanol). The incremental cost of
building a FFV versus a non-FFV is estimated at
approximately $150. Once a conventional vehicle
has been manufactured, however, the conversion
to flexible-fuel can cost much more.
The reality is that FFV technology is readily
available at a low cost and has been implemented
in Brazil by the same auto manufacturers that pro-
duce cars in the United States. The issue of fuel
flexibility is not technological—rather, it is politi-
cal. The current U.S. fuel infrastructure (which is
owned by oil producers and refiners) widely resists
energy products not manufactured from within the
petroleum system. It also is clear that in the current
economic environment, the oil network is well
funded to keep allies aligned with its interests.
Because of the political barriers to expanded
use of ethanol, the NCGA supports the open fuel
standard. Enabling biofuels to break the current oil
monopoly may require even more than that effort.
It may, for example, require “legislation requiring
all major oil companies to convert pumps for E85
at 50 percent of their owned or branded stations”
(Sandalow, 2007, p. 93) or “legislation prohibiting
franchise agreements that limit pumps for biofuels
at service stations” (p. 94)—as Brookings Institution
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Table 1
The Impact of Rising Corn Prices on a Box of Corn Flakes
Corn costs Estimated retail price
$2/bu = $4/bu = $6/bu = Increase (%) in the Increase (%) due to
Item $0.035/lb $0.07/lb $0.107/lb As of April 2008 past 17 months corn costs
Corn Flakes cereal, $0.028 $0.056 $0.086 $3.69 $1.06 (40%) $0.06 (6%)
18-oz box: 12.9 oz of
milled corn produces
one 18-oz box (USDA)energy and environment scholar David Sandalow
recommends in his important book, Freedom
from Oil.
Biofuels are already ready to play an important
role in freeing us from our dependence on foreign
oil, and the relevant technologies are only going
to improve. But political action is clearly needed
to allow them to reach their potential.
CONCLUSION
Ethanol sourced from corn has become the
primary and most successful biofuel to date. As
such, it has generated the most focus, criticism,
and scrutiny. It is important to realize that corn
ethanol is still a formative and nascent industry
that is undergoing rapid transformation and tech-
nological change. 
Critics tend to focus on old metrics and unequal
comparisons. The future of ethanol sourced from
cellulosics1 is bright and necessary, but it is theo-
retical at this point. Cellulosics will evolve from
the success of corn ethanol, not as a revolution
displacing it. Cellulosic ethanol will not occur
without the technological advances developed in
current plants that are producing corn ethanol. 
The biofuels market is broad and wide, requir-
ing both corn ethanol and sugar-based ethanol as
well as other sources of cellulosics. Sources are
complementary and should not be cast as competi-
tors, particularly in an unequal fashion.
The future for corn ethanol in the United States
is bright. The trends in the cost of production,
productivity, and sustainability are all moving in
a positive direction. Corn ethanol is the bridge to
second- and third-generation biofuels, but it will
continue to play a key role for the foreseeable future
as we develop alternative sources to petrochemical
feedstocks. 
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Long-Term Sustainability in the
U.S. Corn Ethanol Industry:
Some Key Determinants
Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes, James Kaufman,
Wyatt Thompson, and Seth Meyer
T
he U.S. ethanol industry has changed 
dramatically in the past five years. Driven
by the need for national energy independ-
ence, concerns over air quality, and an interest in
rural development, a number of government poli-
cies were introduced within the span of a few years
and had significant impact. The 2004 ethanol tax
credits, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the 2006
ban of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), and
later the Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007 all significantly expanded the opportunity
for ethanol use in the United States. 
A positive macroeconomic environment also
played a role. Robust global economic expansion
led to strong and sustained growth in the demand
for oil and gasoline for the better part of this decade.
Gasoline prices grew steadily in the United States
from 2002 on and along with them ethanol prices.
The fast-expanding market for ethanol and strong
prices led to large investments in new productive
capacity. From the beginning of 2002 to the end of
2008, the ethanol industry grew from 61 plants with
a combined capacity of 2.3 billion gallons per year
to 170 plants with 12 billion gallons of capacity
(Renewable Fuels Association [RFA], 2009a). 
The decline of gasoline and ethanol prices from
their meteoric rise in the summer of 2008 and the
softening demand for fuels amid the worst recession
in decades have raised concerns about overcapacity
and the long-term sustainability of the ethanol
industry. Government policies and macroeconomic
conditions will continue to influence the future
profitability of the corn ethanol industry in the
United States, but so will the strategies that firms
pursue in the coming years. 
This article examines the recent cyclical move-
ments in the revenues and capital outlays of the
U.S. corn ethanol industry and evaluates their likely
trends and impacts on the industry’s sustainability.
It also examines the potential contribution of factors
under the control of ethanol firms: the pursuit of
efficiencies and technical innovation. 
DRIVERS OF PROFITABILITY IN
THE ETHANOL INDUSTRY
Industry sustainability starts the drive for profit  -
ability at the ethanol plant. For any dry grind
ethanol plant, the bulk of the revenues comes from
two products: ethanol (85 percent) and coproduct
dried distillers’ grains with solubles (DDGS; 15 per-
cent). Similarly, a single input—corn—accounts
for 65 percent of a plant’s variable costs (Hofstrand,
2008). Because DDGS are used as feed for livestock,
they can substitute for corn in animal rations. For
this reason, corn and DDGS prices tend to move
together. This correlation simplifies the calculation
of plant profitability. 
Plant managers and analysts alike can approxi-
mate plant profitability with the simple calculation
shown in Table 1. For example, if corn were $3.25
per bushel and ethanol $1.80 per gallon, then a dry
mill’s return over operating costs would be $0.35
per gallon. A combination of corn at $3.25 and
ethanol at $1.60 would cut the per gallon return by
more than half, to $0.15. Assuming that the average
payment to capital invested is equal to $0.20 per
gallon, this net return would not attract investment.
Corn at $3.25 and ethanol at $1.40 or less would
result in outright losses per gallon of ethanol pro-
duced, likely leading to plant closures if such prices
and losses persisted.
A higher ethanol price or lower corn price
would tend to increase profitability. In 2006, for
instance, when ethanol was around $2.50 per gallon
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of ethanol was also higher than the price of gasoline
during the 1980s and 1990s. Ethanol and gasoline
burn differently and as a result ethanol-blended
fuel improves the performance of some cars.
Accordingly, consumer demand for ethanol as a
fuel supplement resulted in price premiums over
the 1980-2000 period (Tyner, 2007). 
As ethanol production capacity rose from less
than one billion gallons in the mid-1990s to almost
double that by 2000, ethanol price premiums
eroded, suggesting the fuel-supplement market
segment was more than saturated (see Figure 1).
As ethanol supplies mounted, with production
and imports growing to about four billion gallons
by 2005 (Figure 2), the energy-equivalent price of
ethanol began to lag gasoline prices. The price of
ethanol, however, did not fall during the early part
of the decade. Rather, it rose by more than 80 per-
cent between 1999 and 2005—but it did not keep
pace with the price of gasoline, which nearly tripled
over the same period. 
Then in 2006, regulatory changes led fuel
blenders to discontinue the use of MTBE in some
markets and replace it with ethanol (Westhoff et al.,
2007). Previously, MTBE had been required as a
Panel Discussion
and corn around $3.00 per bushel, average returns
over operating costs for a dry mill were $1.12 per
gallon—a rather hefty return to capital. 
These calculations of operational profitability
illustrate a simple reality in the corn ethanol indus-
try: Understanding the long-term sustainability of
ethanol requires knowledge of the factors that shape
the price of ethanol and its relationship to the price
of corn. Recent history provides some guidance. 
The Price of Ethanol and the Factors
That Shape It
The ethanol market evolved quickly over only
a few years, often clouding the exact relationship
between ethanol prices and the market forces that
shape them. Historically, ethanol has been more
expensive than gasoline on a per-gallon basis
(Figure 1). However, an energy-equivalent price
reflecting ethanol’s energy content offers a better
comparison of value.1 The energy-equivalent price
0.00
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Figure 1
Ethanol and Gasoline Prices
NOTE: Prices are Omaha prices to fuel blenders; the energy-equivalent ethanol price is two-thirds the price of gasoline. Prices are not
adjusted for the ethanol tax credit.
SOURCE: Nebraska state government (www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html), with 2008 preliminary data from the Food and Agriculture
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri–Columbia (MU).
1 Ethanol is not exactly the same as gasoline. One difference is energy
content. A gallon of ethanol has about two-thirds the amount of
energy as a gallon of gasoline, which implies that ethanol usually
propels a car only two-thirds of the distance of an equivalent volume
of gasoline.fuel additive to reduce certain pollutants emitted
by gasoline. Its use was concentrated in urban areas
and periods when air pollution levels were high.
MTBE replacement led to a sudden expansion in
the demand for ethanol that pushed the limits of
domestic production capacity. Ethanol prices spiked
in 2006 as blenders outbid one another for ethanol
to use as an additive (see Figure 1). Increased profit  -
ability in 2006 helped spur increases in production.
Additive use was met and quickly exceeded, so the
premiums associated with additive use once again
eroded, and analysts do not expect them to return
(de Gorter and Just, 2007; and Thompson, Meyer,
and Westhoff, 2008). The energy-equivalent price
of ethanol has since continued to lag the price of
gasoline as an increasing amount of ethanol-
blended fuel has been purchased simply as a sub-
stitute for gasoline. 
A number of federal and state policies have
facilitated the expansion of corn ethanol from the
supplement, to the additive, and, more recently,
the fuel replacement market segment. Significant
policies include tax credits for fuel blenders ($0.45
per gallon of ethanol used), an import tariff ($0.54
per gallon of imported ethanol), and, more recently,
via the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) legislation,
a mandated volume of renewable fuel that must be
blended with gasoline (10.5 billion gallons of corn
ethanol for 2009). Both the tax credits and the RFS
mandate have expanded the demand for corn
ethanol, and the import tariff has maintained
ethanol prices at slightly higher levels. 
Because of such structural shifts in the demand
and supply of ethanol, the exact ethanol price mech-
anism remains somewhat uncertain. For instance,
analysts disagree about how ethanol in E10 (fuel
that is 10 percent ethanol by volume) is effectively
priced. It could be reasonable to assume that the
price of ethanol is determined by the price of E10
relative to the price of gasoline and the energy con-
tent of E10 relative to that of gasoline. However,
two points may indicate otherwise. First, in areas
where air-quality regulations require that local fuels
contain an additive, consumers have no choice but
to buy fuel with ethanol. Second, consumers might
not realize the lower energy content of E10 because
it is still 90 percent gasoline, so the negative effect
on miles per gallon may be 3 percent or so. If this
reasoning holds, then ethanol is priced according
to the volume of gasoline it displaces (Tyner, 2007).
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Figure 2
U.S. Domestic and Imported Ethanol
SOURCE: Data for 1993-2007 are from the Department of Energy (DOE), Energy Information Association (EIA); tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/
pet/pet_pnp_oxy_dc_nus_mbbl_m.htm). Data for 2008 are from FAPRI-MU baseline projections. The opposing view addresses both these points.
First, the ethanol market has expanded well beyond
the additive segment and the price of ethanol must
be low enough to induce demand in markets where
ethanol-blended fuels must compete with gasoline.
Second, because enough buyers are both informed
and discriminating, the price of E10 at retail should
be lower than the price of gasoline. This opposing
view, then, suggests that the price of ethanol is
increasingly set according to its energy content
(de Gorter and Just, 2007; and Thompson, Meyer,
and Westhoff, 2008).
Looking ahead and barring major changes in
the current policy environment, further expansion
in ethanol use beyond the E10 market is likely to
occur only by increasing sales of E85.2 This fuel,
which has as much as 85 percent ethanol, causes
a clear reduction in mileage, so it is likely to sell
in large volumes only if competitively priced on
an energy-equivalent basis with gasoline. Regard  -
less of their position on E10, analysts tend to agree
that a large expansion of the E85 market would
drive the price of ethanol to compete with the price
of gasoline on an energy-equivalent basis (Tyner,
2007; and Thompson, Meyer, and Westhoff, 2008). 
The Relationship of Ethanol and Corn
Prices 
The price of ethanol is an important determi-
nant for the long-term profitability of the U.S. corn
ethanol industry, and its relationship to the price
of corn is as essential. For the most part, manufac-
turing industries that add value to agricultural com-
modities price their products based on processing
and marketing margins, which are added to the
price of the commodity feedstock. Accordingly,
their revenues and costs are closely linked. In the
case of ethanol production, such a link does not
exist because the bulk of revenue is determined in
the petroleum (gasoline) market, while most of its
cost is determined in the corn market—two markets
that have historically exhibited little association
(Figure 3). Wide fluctuations in corn and petroleum
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2 It is estimated that the current E10 market could be saturated by
approximately 15 billion gallons of ethanol a year.
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Corn Prices in Nominal and Real Terms and Relative to Petroleum Prices
SOURCE: Average corn prices are from the USDA Economic Research Service; www.ers.usda.gov/data/feedgrains/FeedGrainsQueriable.aspx.
Petroleum prices are from the DOE EIA; tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/mer_data.asp?table=T09.01. The producer price index for finished
goods is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PPIFGS/downloaddata?cid=31.Panel Discussion
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Corn Stocks-to-Use Ratio
SOURCE: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service Production, Supply, and Distribution database.
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Ethanol Dry Mill Costs and Returns per Bushel of Corn Processed
NOTE: Returns include the value of ethanol and DDGS sold per bushel of corn.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using various sources, including Nebraska state government ethanol plant price and USDA cost data.prices in recent months have put this lack of asso-
ciation in sharp focus. 
Petroleum price variability is not new, but it
may have been largely forgotten when the cost of
a barrel was $20 or less in the early part of this
decade. The runup to over $140 per barrel in 2008
ended any complacency. And the subsequent drop
to $40 per barrel shocked perhaps the ethanol
industry as much as anyone because ethanol prices
quickly followed suit. 
Price swings in the corn market are similarly
not new (see Figure 3). Both demand and supply
factors influence corn prices over time. Changes
in the demand for corn are generally incremental
and anticipated; however, shifts in the supply due
to weather, pest infestations, and other shocks are
more abrupt and can have significant short-term
effects on corn prices. Demand and supply factors
and even speculators have been viewed as key
drivers of the recent volatility in corn markets (e.g.,
Sanders, Erwin, and Merrin, 2008; and Trostle,
2008). Moreover, the current environment of low
buffer stocks might also be playing a role because
demand and supply shocks are magnified under
such conditions (Figure 4).
If the prices of petroleum and corn moved in
concert, their variability would have limited effects
on the ethanol industry. Yet, historical movements
in corn and petroleum prices have been largely
unrelated (see Figure 3), leaving revenues and
costs in ethanol production unlinked and causing
large swings in the profitability of ethanol plants
(Figure 5). The magnitude of this problem is not
easily overstated. When the price of corn relative
to the price of petroleum has increased, ethanol
profitability has suffered. Further, this inverse
relationship has become progressively stronger as
ethanol has progressed from a supplement to an
additive to a fuel replacement. As price premiums
for the more inelastic supplement and additive seg-
ments eroded and corn prices increased relative
to gasoline, profitability declined more abruptly
(e.g., first in the early 1990s and more recently in
2008; see Figures 3 and 5). 
The inverse relationship of corn and petro-
leum prices suggests that sustained high petro-
leum (ethanol) and low corn prices could yield
windfall profits for the ethanol industry. At the
same time, any random sustained confluence of
high corn prices and low petroleum (ethanol) prices
could be quite damaging to the U.S. corn ethanol
industry. Hedging could guard against some unde-
sirable corn-to-ethanol (or petroleum) price spreads,
albeit at some cost. Nevertheless, such strategies
can provide only short-term relief because futures
contracts for certain commodities (e.g., corn and
ethanol) may not extend long enough to cover the
sustained trends in relative corn/petroleum prices
that have been observed in the past (see Figure 3);
and if they did, they could be quite costly.3
Probably the most significant “hedge” against
the possibility of unprofitably high relative corn
prices is currently provided by the renewable fuels
mandates. They indirectly link ethanol and corn
prices because blenders must use the required corn
ethanol irrespective of price.4 However, such a
hedge is generally most effective when the mandate
is greater than the productive capacity of the indus-
try. Because the productive capacity of the U.S.
corn ethanol industry has exceeded the mandated
limits up to now, the level of protection afforded
by the RFS remains uncertain. 
THE PURSUIT OF EFFICIENCIES
As the U.S. corn ethanol industry has grown
to its current capacity and increasingly competes
with gasoline as a replacement fuel, the pursuit of
efficiency and cost effectiveness has become cen-
tral to its success and long-term sustainability.
The potential for efficiency gains can be evaluated
only through a careful assessment of the current
state of the industry and of the areas where gains
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3 There are also some natural hedges in ethanol production that reduce
the industry’s risk exposure and are worth noting. DDGS and corn
are substitutes and as such their prices are closely correlated. Another
natural hedge, albeit a less pronounced one, is the link between
petroleum and ethanol prices, which helps to drive ethanol prices,
and the cost of natural gas and other fuels that fire ethanol plants.
While such prices tend to move together, the correlation between
petroleum and natural gas prices is not very strong, particularly for
short-term shocks. 
4 Several factors may diminish the effective hedge provided by the RFS
against high relative corn prices in any given year. First, fuel blenders
can use renewable identification number credits from previous years
to meet up to 20 percent of the mandated quantities in subsequent
years and may be permitted briefly to fall short. Second, the legisla-
tion allows mandates to be waived if broad conditions are met. 
Panel Discussionmight be possible. Nevertheless, some initial useful
observations can be made. 
With the swift growth of the U.S. ethanol indus-
try in the past decade, the average ethanol plant
size grew rapidly. Facilities built just 10 years ago
were comparatively small in size: The average
facility produced just over 30 million gallons per
year (MGY). A few large ethanol facilities, mostly
wet mills, pushed the average firm size upward.
The average facility size gradually increased until
the mid-2000s and then dramatically accelerated
(Figure 6). By early 2009, the average facility pro-
duced 72 MGY (RFA, 2009b), with at least 37 facili-
ties topping 100 MGY (Ethanol Producer Magazine,
2009).
These newer and larger facilities were built to
take advantage of scale economies. Capital costs
per gallon of capacity for a 100 MGY facility are
20 percent lower than those for a 50 MGY facility
(Eidman, 2007). Larger facilities also have lower
operating costs. When corn was priced at $4 per
bushel, a 100 MGY facility had 3.5 percent lower
variable costs than a plant half that size—with the
variable cost savings increasing as corn prices
decreased (Eidman, 2007).
The continued entry of new ethanol firms dur-
ing this period of fast growth also produced a dis-
persed and increasingly competitive industry, as
evidenced by a fast declining Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI; Figure 7). Much of the pre-2000 ethanol
production capacity was at large wet mills owned
by major agribusinesses. In this environment, the
industry was relatively concentrated, with an HHI
above 1,800 (U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2008).
As new dry mills were built, the HHI fell rapidly,
ultimately bottoming out in 2007 at 292—indicat-
ing minimal levels of industry concentration and
disperse ownership of assets. 
Not all ethanol firms have responded well to
the recent economic downturn. Many have expe-
rienced financial problems from eroding and even
negative margins and several have filed for bank-
ruptcy, including a few large firms such as VeraSun
(filed in October 2008), Renew Energy (filed in
January 2009), and Panda Ethanol (filed in January
2009). As a result, by the end of 2008 roughly 1.8
billion gallons, or 16 percent, of total U.S. ethanol
production capacity had been idled (RFA, 2009a). 
The need to improve the performance of existing
capital assets under the pressure of overcapacity,
Panel Discussion
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Industry Growth and Average Firm Size in the U.S. Corn Ethanol Industry
SOURCE: RFA, “Industry Statistics”; www.ethanolrfa.org/industry.statistics/.uncertain demand, and weak processing margins
has fomented an environment ripe for industry
restructuring and consolidation that will ration
existing assets and capitalize on scale and scope
economies. Given the low level of industry concen-
tration and the dispersed location and ownership
of capital assets, the potential efficiency gains are
large. Sources of such scale and scope economies
include (i) superior management and other human
capital; (ii) improved sourcing of inputs (e.g., yeast,
chemicals, and credit); (iii) centralized grain origi-
nation; (iv) advanced supply-chain management
through multiple plant locations; (v) improved
ability to market and price ethanol; (vi) enhanced
potential for development and commercialization
of coproduct value streams; (vii) centralized and
more sophisticated hedging of inputs, outputs,
and spreads; and (viii) increased capacity to man-
age research and development and regulatory
compliance.
Each of these factors can improve the opera-
tional effectiveness and profitability of ethanol
firms. For instance, optimal plant size and location
must account for distance to urban markets where
most ethanol is consumed and rural locations
where corn is sourced and DGGS are used. Consoli  -
dation of multiple plants in selected locations
under common ownership could therefore yield
sizeable economic gains through improved market
access and supply-chain optimization. Similarly,
larger firms are generally better positioned to fund
and perform research and development, which
involves large up-front fixed costs. Already, many
of the larger U.S. ethanol firms have active research
programs, some cofunded by the U.S. government,
to develop and implement new technologies such
as cellulosics (which uses the non-starch, typically
fibrous, structural parts of plants to make ethanol)
and fractionation (a process that removes nonfer-
mentable components from fermentable ones).
Consolidation into larger firms could therefore
accelerate innovation, improve efficiency, and
make the industry more competitive.
Industry consolidation has already started, but
at a slow pace. As tight credit markets continue in
the wake of the recent economic crisis, financing
for mergers and acquisitions remains constricted.
As credit markets begin to thaw, consolidation in
the industry could accelerate. The restructuring of
the corn ethanol industry could therefore occur
quite quickly. Efficiency gains from restructuring
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Figure 7
Entry and Industry Concentration in the U.S. Corn Ethanol Industry, 1999-2008
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2008).and consolidation, however, would likely be
more gradual and ongoing and therefore take
longer to contribute to the competitiveness and
sustainability of the industry. 
THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION
Another key source of sustained productivity
gains in the corn ethanol industry is technical inno-
vation. Some of the innovations have been devel-
oped by the ethanol industry while others by allied
industries. Indeed, corn has been an attractive
ethanol feedstock due, in large part, to an advanced
and efficient system of breeding, production, and
handling. Between 1980 and 2008, the average U.S.
corn yield rose from 104 bushels per acre to 153
bushels per acre (United States Department of
Agriculture [USDA], 2008a). Over the same period,
processing improvements at ethanol facilities pro-
duced steady efficiency gains, raising ethanol yields
from 2.5 gallons a bushel in 1980 to 2.8 gallons a
bushel in 2007 (Wu, 2008). These two improve-
ments alone increased the amount of ethanol
derived from an acre of corn by 62 percent. 
The pipeline of future technical innovations
that could improve the cost competitiveness of
corn ethanol production is even more promising.
Historically, farm-level improvements have come
from improved hybrids, precision agriculture,
improved machinery, integrated pest management,
reduced tillage, and other innovations. One recent
addition is biotechnology, which has already
demonstrated its ability to lower production costs,
increase yields, and reduce the environmental
footprint of corn production (Fernandez-Cornejo
and Caswell, 2006; and Kalaitzandonakes, 2003).
Because of such advances, in 2008 four of five corn
acres in the United States were planted with biotech
hybrids (USDA, 2008b). Continuing research and
development promises a burgeoning pipeline of
novel corn traits. While the pipeline builds on the
efficacy of first-generation offerings such as insect
and herbicide resistance, it also promises new traits
such as drought resistance, increased nitrogen
utilization, and improved yields. Ultimately these
technologies promise to accelerate the growth in
corn yields and productivity. 
Innovative technologies that offer significant
productivity gains are also expected at ethanol
facilities and include the following:
• Corn Oil Extraction. With this technology, a
conventional dry mill will be able to remove
corn oil after the ethanol distillation process.
This will not only produce a second coprod-
uct and revenue stream but also decrease
the costs associated with drying DDGS.
• Raw Starch Hydrolysis. With this technology,
increased/improved enzymes eliminate the
need for liquefaction and saccharification;
biotechnology facilitates the hydrolysis
process through corn engineered to produce
amylase enzymes in the seed. High-amylase
corn eliminates the need for additional
enzymes in raw starch hydrolysis.
• Dry Mill Corn Fractionation. This technol-
ogy separates the starch from nonfermentable
portions of the corn. High-starch slurry
allows for increased ethanol yield and capac-
ity utilization. Corn oil and fiber can also be
separated with this technology.
• Corn Kernel Fiber to Ethanol. In combina-
tion with fractionation this technology could
convert fiber to ethanol, further increasing
the ethanol yield.
• Highly Fermentable Corn. This biotechnology
produces corn hybrids with improved fer-
mentation characteristics that allow ethanol
to be produced more efficiently. Existing
highly fermentable corn hybrids derived
from traditional breeding have, on average,
a 5 percent higher starch content, which can
result in a 2.7 percent increase in ethanol
yield (Haefel et al., 2004). 
The potential effects of these and other tech-
nologies on the efficiency and profitability of
ethanol production is sizeable. 
We now measure the potential effects of new
biotech corn traits and certain process engineering
innovations on ethanol production while account-
ing for all relevant market effects. We use two sce-
narios to evaluate the potential aggregate yield
effects of new biotech corn traits; however, we
ignore other potential efficiency gains from lower
input use (e.g., pesticides), changes in agronomic
practices (e.g., tillage), and the like. 
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corn yields have grown 1.35 percent per year for
the past 40 years (USDA, 2008a). Specific biotech-
nology innovations and experimental field data
indicate that 1.8 to 3.0 percent growth in yields
might be possible in the near future (e.g., Korves,
2008; and Edgerton, 2008). We use these figures as
the lower and upper bounds for our analysis. To
account for the efficiency gains from process engi-
neering and other innovations that improve the
efficiency of the ethanol plant, we analyze the addi-
tional effect of 1.0 percent annual growth in the
ethanol yield per bushel of corn. 
As corn innovations are introduced in the
market place, they change the relative productivity
of the crop, and farmers respond through their
planting decisions. These in turn shift the aggre-
gate supplies of corn and other crops, change their
relative prices, and shift their demand. Similar,
though more limited, changes occur in response
to process innovations at the ethanol plant. To
account for such complex market changes, we use
the FAPRI-MU model of crops and biofuel markets
(Thompson, Meyer, and Westhoff, 2008). This
partial-equilibrium model covers supply and
demand quantities, including acreage planted,
production, other domestic uses, trade, stocks,
prices, and policies. In this context we evaluate the
economic implications of the innovation scenarios
discussed above for the 2009-18 period. This empir-
ical analysis allows us to examine the potential
effects of innovation on the supply of ethanol and
the average profitability of the U.S. ethanol indus-
try. The results are presented in Table 2 and are
expressed as changes relative to a baseline where
corn and ethanol yields grow at their historical
averages—1.35 percent and 0.5 percent per year,
respectively. 
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Table 2
Potential Impacts of Innovations in Ethanol Production and Operating Returns
Percent change with 1.8% corn  Percent change with 3.0% corn 
Variable and 1% ethanol yield growth and 1% ethanol yield growth
Corn yield (bushels/acre) 2.5 10.2
Dry mill yield (gallons/bushel) 2.8 2.8
Corn market
Planted area –0.1 –0.6
Production 0.0 9.5
Total domestic use 1.7 6.7
Fuel 1.9 8.2
Feed 1.9 7.2
Food 0.3 1.0
High-fructose corn syrup 0.0 0.2
Exports 4.7 17.4
Corn farm price –2.9 –11.7
Ethanol Market
Production 4.4 10.8
Ethanol price –1.0 –2.5
Ethanol dry milling returns (per gallon)
Ethanol revenue –1.0 –2.5
DDGS revenue –7.2 –17.5
Corn cost –5.4 –13.9
Net operating returns 7.7 30.1The empirical results from the partial-
equilibrium analysis suggest that accelerating
corn and ethanol yield growth rates shift corn and
ethanol supplies upward. Given that aggregate corn
demand is somewhat inelastic, when corn prices
decline, demand increases. In domestic markets,
the use of corn for food, feed, and fuel all increases.
Exports of corn increase even faster as export mar-
kets respond to movements in U.S. corn prices. The
reduction in corn prices also reduces the cost of
ethanol production, lowering the price of ethanol
and increasing demand for the biofuel. The magni-
tude of the change is influenced by the responsive-
ness of demand in the ethanol market. Given that
the industry now supplies the supplement, addi-
tive, and the more responsive E10 markets, the out-
ward shift is absorbed by an elastic demand and
the resulting effect on the price of ethanol is small.
The reduced input costs and relatively small
decline in output prices lead to a 7.7 to 30 percent
increase in net operating returns per gallon. It is
worth emphasizing that these effects are over and
above the improvements in operating returns that
are expected with the continued growth of corn
and ethanol yields at their historical rates. 
The results of the partial-equilibrium model
illustrate the potentially significant impact of new
technologies on the level of efficiency and profit  -
ability of the U.S. ethanol industry. As firms con-
tinue to develop and adopt such new technologies,
the industry will become more competitive and
its sustainability will significantly improve. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Fueled by government policies and a positive
macroeconomic environment, the U.S. ethanol
industry has experienced strong and ongoing
growth since the turn to this century. Over this
nine-year period, the industry transformed itself
from a niche player to a significant supplier of fuel
to compete with gasoline in the U.S. market. As
the macroeconomic environment worsened in the
later part of 2008, the industry’s growth stalled
and the viability of some of the newly installed
capacity became uncertain as petroleum, ethanol,
and corn prices declined and ethanol processing
margins with them.
This last stage of the industry cycle has created
an environment where consolidation could follow.
Industry consolidation could yield sizeable effi-
ciency gains from scale and scope economies, as
well as technical improvements and better alloca-
tion of resources. A full pipeline of innovations
could bring large productivity gains to the U.S.
ethanol industry—some targeting the operations
of the mill and some its key feedstock—corn.
Together, efficiency gains from industry consolida-
tion and productivity growth from innovation
could strongly improve the competitiveness and
sustainability of the industry. 
A possible threat to the stability and sustainabil-
ity of the industry, however, is its unlinked revenue-
cost structure, which is increasingly driven by
changes in the relative prices of petroleum and
corn. A random and sustained low-corn, high-
petroleum price combination results in windfall
profits for the industry. A similarly random and
sustained high-corn, low-petroleum price combi-
nation results in lasting losses. Given the wide
variation in the petroleum and corn markets, this
characteristic could make the industry prone to
boom-bust cycles. This issue has attracted little
attention so far, possibly due to the implicit “hedge”
currently offered by the RFS mandates. As the
industry continues to improve its competitive edge
and grow, effective means for linking costs and
revenues might become necessary to prevent this
subtle industry feature from becoming its Achilles’
heel. 
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